TWO HISTORIC DISSERTATIONS.

I.

ON THE CAUSES

OF

THE MINISTERIAL SECESSION,

A.D. 1717.

II.

ON

THE TREATY OF HANOVER,

Concluded A.D. 1725.

WITH SOME PREFATORY REMARKS,

IN REPLY TO THE ANIMADVERSIONS OF

THE REV. WILLIAM COXE,

IN HIS

MEMOIRS OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

BY

WILLIAM BELSHAM.

——— TELUMQUE IMBELLE, SINE ICTU
CONJECIT. VIRGIL.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR G. G. AND J. ROBINSON,
PATERNOSTER-ROW.

M,DCC,XCVIII.

8 MAY 1961

PREFATORY REMARKS.

HAVING formed a determination to avoid, if poſſible, any controverſial diſcuſſions, it was a matter of real concern to find myſelf attacked in ſuch a mode by the Rev. W. Coxe, in his late Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, as to render ſome animadverſions on my part, and in my own defence, abſolutely neceſſary. The only inſtance of this kind which has before occurred was in the caſe of Major Scott, who took up the pen in vindication of his friend, Mr. Haſtings, with a warmth and zeal not only to be excuſed but applauded, notwithſtanding the occaſional aſperity of his obſervations. The remarks of that gentleman were, however, blended and ſoftened with conceſſions and compliments, which ſhowed that he did not wiſh to hold me up to the world as a writer devoid of merit, or as a man devoid of principle. And in a

private letter with which I was favored from him, he ſays, " I am much obliged and flat-
" tered by the attention which you have
" paid to the documents which I ſent to
" you; and I have ſo high an opinion of
" your candor and fairneſs as to be convinced,
" that, after having peruſed all the materials
" relating to India, you will, in the next
" edition of your hiſtory, or in a continua-
" tion of it, do Mr. Haſtings the juſtice to
" which you may think him fairly entitled,
" and I have not a wiſh beyond that point."
On the other hand, I truſt, that my reply to him is expreſſive of deference and reſpect, though it was not in my power to change my ſentiments relative to the main points or difference between us. But in regard to Mr. Coxe the caſe is far otherwiſe. In his frequent references to the hiſtory of the Houſe of Brunſwick, he has not once deviated into civility; but, on the contrary, he has taken infinite pains to repreſent the writer as uniformly actuated by a factious and malignant ſpirit, in unqualified terms decrying the work as calculated only to miſlead and to deceive; and

and his objections, with a very few exceptions, are dictated by that perverſeneſs which ſhows a predetermination not to be ſatisfied. But what right or pretence has Mr. Coxe to call in queſtion the motives of any perſon whoſe general character ſtands unimpeached, and who may happen to view paſt or preſent events in a light different from himſelf? I ſhould indeed be ſorry that the greateſt provocation could draw from my pen reflections ſo illiberal and inſolent as thoſe which abound in Mr. Coxe's Memoirs, with no provocation at all. Had I employed my talents, ſuch as they are, in vindication of thoſe who diſpenſe at their will public honors and rewards, my time would have been perhaps more *profitably* ſpent, and I had probably eſcaped the calumnies of Mr. Coxe; but the pen would have dropped from my hand had I attempted the taſk of defending the meaſures of the laſt ten years. If ever it ſhall fall to my lot to treat of the unhappy times in which we live, and of the cauſes in which our preſent misfortunes have originated, regardleſs of unmerited reproach, I ſhall, as I have hitherto

done, with ſtrict hiſtoric impartiality, extenuate nothing, nor ſet down aught in malice.

The general obſervations prefixed to the laſt edition of the Brunſwick hiſtory, it may be hoped, have ſufficiently reſcued the author from the imputation with ſuch unaccountable effrontery brought againſt him, of repreſenting the adminiſtration of Sir Robert Walpole "as an uniform maſs of corruption and depravity." The diſſertations now offered to the world are intended to confirm and corroborate the general tenor of the narrative which Mr. Coxe has attempted to invalidate, in relation to the ſyſtem of foreign politics, which that great miniſter was compelled in a certain degree to adopt and to defend. The preſent prefatory remarks are deſigned curſorily to notice the ſpecific objections urged againſt particular paſſages of the work. The few corrections which appear to be neceſſary would have been ſilently made, had not the patronage which Mr. Coxe has obtained, the literary reputation which he has acquired, and the value of the original

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papers annexed, given his publication an adventitious importance, which ſeems to demand a degree of attention otherwiſe entirely ſuperfluous.

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THE firſt, and indeed one of the moſt important charges brought againſt the hiſtorian of the Houſe of Brunſwick, is "that, "in common with other *party writers*, he has "ſaid ſo much of the ſeverity ſhewn by "Government to the people who took up "arms in favor of the Pretender, that it "might be ſuppoſed thouſands and tens of "thouſands had fallen a ſacrifice to their "miſtaken principles; that no clemency was "ſhewn to any of the rebels, no diſtinction "made between the leaders and their de-"luded followers." Memoirs of Walpole, vol. I. p. 73. For the repreſentations, or miſrepreſentations, of others, the writer of the hiſtory is not reſponſible. All that he has ſaid on the ſubject is as follows: "Al-"though the rebellion in both kingdoms

" was thus happily and ſpeedily ſuppreſſed, " the clemency of the King did not appear " ſo conſpicuous as might have been wiſhed " and reaſonably expected." After mentioning the affecting circumſtances attending the condemnation of the rebel Lords, it is added, " Many of the lower claſſes of the " people alſo fell a ſacrifice to the fatal " deluſion of thoſe miſtaken principles which " led them to engage in this revolt, which " might, in all human probability, have been " eaſily prevented by the adoption of a more " equitable and generous policy,"—at the ſame time exculpating the King from the imputation of intentional harſhneſs and cruelty. The writer, it ſeems, was miſled by the " peeviſh queſtion" of Lord Somers, " Whe- " ther the Miniſtry meant to revive the " proſcriptions of Marius and Sylla?" (which by the way referred merely to the impeachments previous to the rebellion), to take in its full latitude the malignant aſſertion of Bolingbroke, " that the violence of " the Whigs dyed the royal ermines in " blood." Mr. Coxe tells us that the exe-

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cutions at Mancheſter and Preſton amounted *only* to twenty-two. But we muſt be certified of the number in all other places, Scotland as well as England, before we can pronounce upon the lenity of the Government, even in this point. That the royal clemency "did not appear ſo conſpicuous "on this occaſion as might have been wiſhed "and reaſonably expected" was the ſentiment of divers of the beſt friends of Government, then living, with the beſt opportunities of judging. In oppoſition to the opinion of ſome, who, like Mr. Coxe, ſaw no errors in the conduct of the Miniſters for the time being, Mr. Smith, late Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the reign of King William and Queen Anne, a man highly and univerſally eſteemed, thus expreſſed himſelf in a ſpeech delivered in the Houſe of Commons April 1717: "Was "it not a miſtake not to preſerve the peace "at home, after the King was come to "the throne with the univerſal applauſe "and joyful acclamations of all his ſubjects? "Was it not a miſtake upon the break-

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" ing out of the rebellion not to iſſue a " proclamation to offer pardon to ſuch as " ſhould return home peaceable, as had " ever been practiſed before upon ſuch oc- " caſions? Was it not a miſtake after the " ſuppreſſion of the rebellion, and the trial " and execution of the principal authors " of it, to keep up animoſities and drive " people to deſpair, by not paſſing an Act " of Indemnity and Grace, by keeping ſo " many perſons under hard and tedious " confinement, and by granting pardons to " ſome without leaving them any means " to ſubſiſt?" But Mr. Coxe is apparently of opinion that no puniſhment ſhort of the loſs of life deſerves the name of ſeverity; and he is yet to learn that there are puniſhments far worſe than death. Nay, he thinks that theſe puniſhments may properly paſs under the denomination of mercy! How different are the ideas affixed to the ſame word! and how romantic to a mind unſeaſoned with humanity muſt appear the definition of the Poet:

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The quality of mercy is not ſtrained,
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice bleſt:
It bleſſeth him who gives, and him who takes:
'Tis mightieſt in the mighty—it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown;
It is an attribute of GOD himſelf—
And earthly power doth then ſhew likeſt GOD's
When Mercy ſeaſons Juſtice.

SHAKSPEARE.

P. 291. On the motion of Mr. Shippen, that £. 700,000 only, inſtead of the entire revenue of the Civil Liſt, as propoſed by Sir Robert Walpole, ſhould be ſettled on the new King, Geo. II. it is ſaid, Hiſtory of the Houſe of Brunſwick, vol. I. p. 172, "that "the amendment was rejected by a great "majority," but Mr. Coxe enjoys a minute triumph, by announcing, in important language, that it was rejected without a diviſion.

Mr. Coxe (p. 302), ſtruck with admiration where other writers, and the Hiſtorian of the Houſe of Brunſwick in particular, have expreſſed indignant contempt, ſtiles the Treaty concluded with the Duke of Wolfenbuttle,

fenbuttle, Nov. 1727, "a maſter-piece of policy." To this Treaty the Lord Chancellor King refuſed to affix the Great Seal, previous to its ratification by Parliament; and certainly, ſo far as the intereſts of Great Britain alone are concerned, it muſt be regarded as the moſt prepoſterous of all diplomatic tranſactions. The Duke of Wolfenbuttle engages to guarantee to his Britannic Majeſty the poſſeſſion of his three kingdoms for the *douceur* of £. 100,000, to be paid in four years, and to *keep in readineſs* for his ſervice a body of 5000 troops during that term. But in the political tragi-comedy acting at this time there are two plots, and the under-plot is, by far, the moſt important and intereſting. Though the Preliminaries of a General Pacification were at this time ſigned they were not ratified. A final arrangement had not taken place; the affairs of Germany were ſtill in a critical ſituation, and Hanover might be eventually expoſed to the formidable attacks of Auſtria and Ruſſia. In this ſtate of things the alliance of the Duke of Wolfenbuttle

fenbuttle was, unqueſtionably, of no inconſiderable moment. An agreement had been concluded between him and the Emperor, by which his *Serene Highneſs*, without pretending to guarantee to his Imperial Majeſty the poſſeſſion of his kingdoms, in conſideration of an annual ſubſidy of 200,000 florins, conſented to admit an Auſtrian garriſon into the City of Brunſwick. This was, probably, only meant to excite the alarm of the Court of Herenhauſen; for it is to the laſt degree improbable that the Duke of Brunſwick ſhould really intend to facilitate the entrance of an army of Auſtrians, and much leſs of Ruſſians, into the Circle of Lower Saxony. In theſe circumſtances the Treaty with Great Britain was concluded; and had the troops which his Serene Highneſs engaged *to hold in readineſs* been actually brought into the field, the ſubſidy muſt, no doubt, have been increaſed to an unknown and enormous amount. The Treaty of Wolfenbuttle was evidently one of the innumerable *fry* of Treaties

Treaties ſpawned by that great Leviathan the TREATY of HANOVER.

P. 409. Mr. Coxe has, with peculiar ingenuity, contrived to reproach the hiſtorian of the Houſe of Brunſwick for "invariably "decrying the Walpole adminiſtration," at the very moment that he is compelled to admit his decided reprobation of the motion of Lord Morpeth (vol. I. p. 340), "though "ſupported with all the ſtrength of his fa-"vorite party," as tending to eſtabliſh a ſyſtem of military independence.

P. 412. The writer of the Brunſwick Hiſtory is ſtigmatiſed as a "partial reporter," and charged with a "wilful ſuppreſſion of "argument," becauſe, on the debate which aroſe on Sir John St. Aubyn's motion for the repeal of the Septennial Act, he has quoted a famous paſſage in Sir William Wyndham's Speech, without noticing Sir Robert Walpole's reply. But it ſurely does not belong to the province of general hiſtory to detail the arguments

arguments on both ſides in every parliamentary debate. This would be a tedious and endleſs taſk indeed! It is ſufficient if, on all queſtions of importance, the grounds and reaſons on which our judgments are to be formed, preſent themſelves to view in the regular courſe of the narration. On the preſent occaſion, the arguments are given on neither ſide; having previouſly occurred at the introduction of the Septennial Bill. The quotation from Sir William Wyndham was tranſcribed as an hiſtorical curioſity, which it is abundantly obvious from the general tenor of the work that the hiſtorian could never mean to ſanction with his approbation.

P. 505-9. Mr. Coxe diſcuſſes the ſubject of Sir John Barnard's celebrated motion for reducing the rate of intereſt on the Public debts, and eventually aboliſhing thoſe taxes which moſt heavily oppreſſed the poor and the manufacturer. In the ſpeech which that diſtinguiſhed Citizen and Patriot made in defence of this motion, Mr. Coxe is pleaſed to affirm, "that he betrayed ſuch a confuſion of

"projects

" projects and indiſtinctneſs of ideas, aſſumed " ſo many principles which were untrue, " and ſo violently tranſgreſſed the bounds of " parliamentary engagement—*that the motion* " *was negatived by* 200 *againſt* 142*!*" as if a mere majority againſt the motion were proof incontrovertible of the truth of his bold and ſlanderous aſſertions. The charge againſt the hiſtorian of the Houſe of Brunſwick relative to this buſineſs is, that in ſpeaking of the Bill ordered on the baſis of Winnington's propoſition (vol. I. p. 380), which was a mere extenſion of Sir John Barnard's original motion, he declares " that being in the ſequel warmly " attacked and faintly defended, it was finally " poſtponed to a diſtant day, by *a motion* of the " Miniſter." In which ſhort account Mr. Coxe pretends to the merit of diſcovering three errors. Firſt, it was not faintly defended. The fact is, that Winnington's reſolutions on the Report were carried by a majority of 220 to 157 voices; but, on the queſtion of commitment, ſo much had the zeal of the Partizans of the Bill declined, and that of its opponents increaſed, that it

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was negatived by 249 to 134 voices; ſo that it is plain the Bill was not only faintly defended, but abſolutely abandoned by great numbers of its pretended friends; though, in point of argument, no doubt ſtrongly ſupported by its real ones. Secondly, it was not finally poſtponed to a diſtant day, but the ſecond reading was only put off for ſeven days. Thirdly, it was then negatived, but not on *the motion* of the Miniſter. So captious a Critic as Mr. Coxe ſhould at leaſt be careful to quote accurately. The expreſſion in the original is neither *a* motion, or *the* motion; but ſimply, by motion of the Miniſter, which, in hiſtoric though not parliamentary phraſeology, might, by a very candid remarker, be conſtrued as equivalent to *ſuggeſtion*. But in ſuch a caſe as this it is much eaſier and better to correct than to defend, and the general ſtatement may, without heſitation, be thus amended—" which being " in the ſequel warmly attacked, and faintly " defended, was finally loſt on the motion of " commitment."

Not ſatisfied with the reaſons aſſigned, in the able and eloquent ſpeech of Sir Robert Walpole, for the diſſent of the Miniſter, Mr. Coxe has been kind enough to ſuggeſt two others, the reſult of his own happy ſagacity. 1ſt. "He foreſaw, from the diſputes "with Spain, which then began to ariſe, that "the nation might be involved in a war, "and that Government could borrow with "greater facility at four per cent than three." From this it appears, that the profound knowledge of Mr. Coxe, in matters of revenue, has led him to conceive, in caſe the public funds were reduced to three per cent intereſt, that the Government would be neceſſarily limited to the ſame rate of intereſt in the negotiating of a new loan. 2dly. "Sir Robert Walpole entertaining," as Mr. Coxe tells us, "a deſign of alienating the "whole ſurplus of the ſinking fund, feared "this intention would be fruſtrated by a plan "which would have rendered it neceſſary to "impoſe new taxes, for the purpoſe of ſup-"plying the incidental expences." But with the

the permiſſion of this great financier, ſuppoſing the taxes eventually aboliſhed equal in amount to the ſaving propoſed to be made by the reduction of intereſt, the ſurplus of the ſinking fund would remain preciſely the ſame; and in caſe of a war, the Miniſter would poſſeſs the advantage of being enabled to defray the increaſed expence, by merely reviving old taxes inſtead of adding new ones. Mr. Coxe is diſpleaſed that Mr. Pelham's plan of reduction, A.D. 1749-50, is deſcribed as "ſimilar to the original ſcheme propoſed "by Sir John Barnard." He declares it to be "eſſentially different;" and knowledge of finance being his *forte*, he expects us doubtleſs to acquieſce in his *ipſe dixit*, in lieu and in abſence of all argument. Sir John Barnard himſelf probably thought otherwiſe, as according to Mr. Coxe's own acknowledgment, the plan of Mr. Pelham was carried into effect againſt much oppoſition, by the united efforts of Sir John Barnard and the Miniſter.

In the conciſe account given of the debate

(vol. I. p. 372) A.D. 1737, on a motion made by the Oppoſition for a reduction of the ſtanding military force, a charge is brought, of having "ſhamefully miſrepreſented the "ſpeech of Sir Robert Walpole;" and a tranſcript is given from Smollet, to ſhow "how "careleſsly the hiſtorian of the Houſe of "Brunſwick has copied his narrative, and "added his own errors." Undoubtedly in this, and in ſeveral other paſſages, free uſe has been made, and Mr. Coxe has availed himſelf in the ſame manner (vide p. 563-9, &c.) of the ſuccinct parliamentary reports of Dr. Smollet, which are ſometimes ſpirited and judicious. And in all inſtances of this kind the copier is beyond queſtion reſponſible for the adopted errors of the copy, as well as for thoſe more peculiarly his own. For Smollet's expreſſion of the "adherents of the Miniſter" the copier has uſed the term Miniſtry; he has ſubſtituted the word predominate for prevail, and frequent Parliaments for triennial Parliaments, &c. Perhaps theſe trifling variations, as they allow ſcope for the petulance of cavil, had been better avoided. The author followed

followed in this inſtance is never ſafely to be confided in as an authority; and upon referring to the report of the debate, as it ſtands in Chandler, Mr. Coxe's remark appears to be juſt, "that Smollet imputes to the *adherents* "of the Miniſter expreſſions which were only "uſed by *one* individual member"—Colonel Mordaunt.—"And," he adds, "Belſham, "omitting the words *adherents of* and putting "only *the Miniſtry*, leaves the reader to ſup-"poſe that Walpole himſelf, or ſome of the "Miniſtry, had been *ſo abſurd as to declare* "a ſtanding army neceſſary, to ſupport the "Whig intereſt." But this is mere trifling; if the doctrine thus promulgated was heard in ſilence by the Miniſter, that ſilence muſt unavoidably be interpreted into conſent. Sir Robert Walpole on this, and indeed on all occaſions, affected to ſpeak of the Whigs as the only perſons who were real friends to the Government, and of the Tories as concealed Jacobites; and he concluded his ſpeech with ſaying, "the leſs number of regular troops we "keep up the more we ſhall always be ex-"poſed to this danger." And on a former

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and ſimilar occaſion, A.D. 1733, Mr. Horace Walpole had been *abſurd enough to declare*, "that the number of troops then propoſed "was abſolutely neceſſary to ſupport his Ma-"jeſty's Government, and would be neceſſary "ſo long as the nation enjoyed the happineſs "of having the preſent illuſtrious family on "the throne." On which Mr. Shippen pronounced "the maſque to be at length thrown "off, and that the exiſting military force, "hitherto continued only from year to year, "was plainly intended to be perpetual."

P. 609. Mr. Coxe treats of the Daniſh Subſidy Treaty, concluded A.D. 1739. "As "this Treaty," ſays he, "was concluded "ſoon after the diſpute concerning Steinhorſt, "and as the caſtle and lordſhip were at the "ſame time ceded by Denmark to Hanover, "the Oppoſition naturally coupled theſe two "events together; and when the Treaty was "announced to the Houſe of Commons, ſug-"geſted that the compromiſe had been made "at the expence of this country, that Stein-"horſt was acquired by Britiſh money."

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Their ſtatement has been adopted as true, and conſigned to the pages of hiſtory, referring to Smollet, vol. III. p. 13—Belſham, vol. I. p. 382. But this affair wearing an appearance ſo extremely ſuſpicious, and the Miniſter refuſing any ſatisfactory explanation, it is no wonder that the two events ſhould have been coupled together in the ſpeeches of Parliament, as well as in the pages of hiſtory. "What "can we reaſon but from what we know?" Mr. Coxe, however, is enabled, from the peruſal of the correſpondence of Titley, Reſident at Copenhagen, with Lord Harrington, to give a decent gloſs to this buſineſs. A war between Great Britain and Spain was at this time in contemplation, in which France would probably be ſoon involved. This, combined no doubt with her political projects on the eventual demiſe of the Emperor, made the Court of Verſailles particularly anxious to ſecure the aſſiſtance of the ſecondary continental Powers. Sweden was already gained, and great offers were made to Denmark, after the affair of Steinhorſt, to detach that kingdom

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alſo from the Britiſh alliance. A ſubſidy of 400,000 rix-dollars, for ſix, eight, or ten years was promiſed by France, who required no troops in return, but on the contrary engaged to ſend a powerful reinforcement to Denmark, in caſe of attack. The King of Denmark, who entertained a fixed hatred both of Sweden and France, communicated theſe propoſitions to Titley, at the ſame time declaring his readineſs to accept leſs advantageous terms from England. On which the Treaty in queſtion was ſhortly after concluded to the mutual ſatisfaction of the Courts of London, Copenhagen, and Hanover; though the queſtion of Lord Carteret ſtill remains unreſolved—"For the attainment of what rational end or "object could theſe Daniſh troops be em-"ployed?" The ſubſidy granted was clearly no other than an exorbitant retaining fee, in the view of another continental war, with reſpect to which Denmark would, in all probability, act preciſely that part which her intereſts at the time ſhould be deemed to require; and not that which a grateful ſenſe of her obligations

obligations to Britain might, in oppoſition to her preſent intereſt, ſuggeſt—*but the Lordſhip of Steinhorſt was ceded to Hanover.*

P. 680. The debate on Sir Robert Walpole's motion for granting a parliamentary aid to the Queen of Hungary is ſaid to be "greatly miſrepreſented" by the hiſtorian of the Houſe of Brunſwick, "who," ſays Mr. Coxe, "obſerves HONEST SHIPPEN *only* "ventured to oppoſe this wild and wanton "waſte of the public money. To *ſupport* "this aſſertion, he has transferred Viner's "*ſpeech* to the firſt Seſſion of the next Par-"liament, vol. II. p. 44-6." Thus is a trivial inadvertency, which could anſwer no imaginable purpoſe of deception—viz. the miſplacing a ſingle remark, for it is no more, of Mr. Viner—magnified by the malevolence of Mr. Coxe into an artful, wilful, and premeditated falſification of hiſtory. Had the miſtake in queſtion, which implies doubtleſs ſome degree of culpable inattention, been pointed out in a candid and gentlemanlike manner, it would have been entitled to the thanks of the hiſto-

rian,—with the actually concomitant circumſtances, it can excite only his pity and contempt.

Theſe are all the paſſages of the hiſtory animadverted upon by Mr. Coxe which, in the judgment even of that vain and egotiſtical writer himſelf, can be ſuppoſed to need apology or defence; and the Public at large, from whom the hiſtorian has experienced the moſt generous indulgence, will now decide how far they affect the general credit of the work, and the reputation and integrity of the writer.

ON

THE CAUSES OF

THE MINISTERIAL SECESSION.

A. D. 1717.

THERE is nothing more difficult to develop, and at the ſame time leſs intereſting in the whole compaſs of hiſtorical diſcuſſion, than the ſecret views, motives, jealouſies, cabals, intrigues and quarrels of Miniſters. The only queſtion which can appear to poſterity of moment, is that which reſpects the political merit or demerit of the meaſures actually adopted. The great celebrity to which Mr. Walpole ſubſequently attained, gives, however, a ſort of artificial importance to the preſent inquiry; and we are ſolicitous to know how far ſo great a man, and ſo great a ſtateſman, was influenced by public, and how far by private, mo-

tives, in joining the ſeceſſion from the Adminiſtration at this period; and in what degree the motives, public or private, in which the ſeceſſion originated, were laudable or juſtifiable. The ſtate-papers recently publiſhed by the Rev. William Coxe, and appended to his Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, throw much light upon this inveſtigation: and though the public motives aſcribed in the HISTORY to Townſhend, Walpole, and their aſſociates, appear to have exiſted, and perhaps to have predominated in their minds, it is no leſs evident that they were likewiſe actuated by thoſe perſonal motives which in the former editions of this Work were ſlightly and diſtantly touched upon.

On the death of the Queen, the Tory faction were not merely excluded from power, but became in their turn the objects of party revenge and political perſecution. Hatred to the Tories appears, indeed, to have been almoſt the ſole principle and bond of union amongſt the Whigs, who entertained againſt each other a degree of animoſity little inferior to that which they diſplayed againſt the common adverſary. During the latter years of the late reign, the Earl of Sunderland, a man of diſtinguiſhed ability and high connections, was conſidered as the great

great political leader of the Whigs; and he had flattered himſelf with the idea of being placed at the head of the new Miniſtry. His moſt formidable rival was, apparently, the Earl of Halifax, who had, in the reign of King William, preſided with the higheſt reputation at the Board of Treaſury; and in the ſubſequent diſtribution of places, this nobleman was reinſtated in his former ſituation. But it was quickly aſcertained that he poſſeſſed no political influence; and his reſentment and diſguſt were ſo openly avowed as to occaſion a prevailing expectation of his reſignation. The true rival was Lord Townſhend, connected with Walpole by marriage with his ſiſter, and who had found means to ingratiate himſelf into the confidence of Baron Bothmar, the Hanoverian Reſident, by whoſe advice the King was chiefly actuated in forming the new miniſterial arrangements, in which the poſt of principal Secretary of State was aſſigned to Townſhend, and that of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to the Earl of Sunderland. This exalted ſtation appeared to Sunderland only as a ſplendid baniſhment; and viewing the aſcendency of Townſhend with aſtoniſhment and indignation, he eagerly wiſhed to engroſs, or at leaſt to ſhare, the ſupreme direction of affairs in England. On the death of the Marquis of

Wharton, he was recalled from Ireland, and conſtituted Lord Privy Seal. But this was only the footſtep of his ambition. He knew that on the advancement of Townſhend jealouſies had immediately ariſen between the Engliſh Secretary and the Hanoverian Miniſters, Bothmar, Bernſtorf, and Robethon, who were anxious to retain their former influence over the mind of the King. Theſe men were powerfully ſupported by the famous Meleſina Baroneſs of Schulenburg, afterwards created Dutcheſs of Munſter and Kendal, by the laſt of which titles ſhe was commonly known—the favorite miſtreſs of the King, and by many believed to be ſecretly married to him—a woman of great art and intrigue, and, as there is abundant proof, of equal rapacity and avarice; but highly decorous in her manners, cautious and prudent in her external deportment, and who even affected, and perhaps felt—for all theſe qualities may eaſily co-exiſt—a zealous attachment to *religion*; being perfectly exact in her devotions, and conſtantly attending the Lutheran chapels on the Sunday, at one of which ſhe received the holy communion with *regular and exemplary piety*. Such were the perſons to whom Sunderland ſcrupled not to pay his court, ſtriving, by every artifice, to inſinuate himſelf into the

the favor of the Dutcheſs, of whom Walpole declared, "that ſhe was ſo venal a creature, "that ſhe would at any time ſell the King's "honor for a ſhilling to the higheſt bidder."

In the ſummer of 1716 the King, with his German miſtreſſes and miniſters, repaired to the continent, accompanied by Mr Secretary Stanhope, who was as yet on terms of perfect friendſhip and confidence with Townſhend and Walpole. This was the opportunity for which Sunderland wiſhed and waited. Having previouſly obtained permiſſion of the King to go to Aix-la-Chapelle "to drink the waters for "his health," he arrived in a ſhort time at Hanover. The King's viſit to the continent was undertaken extremely againſt the inclination, and even the remonſtrances, of Townſhend and Walpole, who repreſented ſo long an abſence to be highly detrimental to the public intereſt; and they were doubtleſs ſenſible it might eventually prove at leaſt equally injurious to their own. So early as July 30, 1716, Mr. Walpole wrote to Secretary Stanhope "that "there was reaſon to believe the deſigns of "Lord Sunderland, Cadogan, &c. were carried "farther, and were better ſupported than they "had imagined; that all the *foreigners* were

" engaged on their ſide of the queſtion, and " that the Dutcheſs of Munſter entered into " the diſpute with more than ordinary zeal and " reſentment againſt them." He adds, " Never- " theleſs his (*i. e.* Sunderland's) profeſſions for " an entire reconciliation and perfect union are " as ſtrong as *words* can expreſs; and you may " be *ſure* are reciprocal." Auguſt 30, he writes to Secretary Stanhope, " Lord Sunderland " has left us, and *will ſoon be with you.* We " parted with all the profeſſions and aſſurances " of mutual friendſhip and union that was " poſſible. He ſeemed, indeed, ſenſible of the " ill conſequences of the meaſures he had been " engaged in."

But very ſoon after his arrival at Hanover, the effects of his inſidious artifices became fully apparent, and in a mode for which Townſhend and Walpole were by no means prepared. Stanhope, a frank and gallant ſoldier, had, without any claim or pretenſion on his part, been recommended by Lord Townſhend to the office he occupied, chiefly from his inexperience and ſuppoſed incapacity for the management of foreign affairs. And when the deſign of making him Secretary of State was firſt communicated to him, he underſtood

it

it to be propoſed *en raillerie*, and replied in the ſpirit of pleaſantry, by putting his hand to his ſword: nor was it without much reluctance that he was at length prevailed upon to conſent to the appointment. A perfect cordiality appears to have ſubſiſted between Townſhend, Walpole, and Stanhope, till the event of the King's departure for Hanover; and he was regarded as the grand barrier againſt all intrigues that might be attempted to the prejudice of the Miniſters during the reſidence of the King in Germany. But being continually near the perſon of the King, and far diſtant from his colleagues, he ſoon found his own independent conſequence. By the nobleneſs of his manners, and the general liberality of his ſentiments, he gained much upon the favor of the Sovereign, while his ſolicitude to ſecure and extend the influence he had now acquired, his ſpirit of military enterpriſe, and deficiency of political ſagacity, made him facile and open to every ſcheme of the Hanoverian Cabinet. At this moment arrived Sunderland, who with far ſuperior knowledge and talents combined a fixed determination to ſupplant the exiſting Miniſtry, by ſeconding and ſupporting without reſerve all the continental

plans and projects of the Monarch. By his conſummate addreſs he ſoon acquired a decided aſcendency over the generous and unſuſpecting nature of Stanhope, and roſe by rapid gradations into high eſtimation with the King; ſo that in a very few weeks after he had fixed his reſidence at Hanover, Count Gyllenburg, the Swediſh Ambaſſador, ſcrupled not to pronounce him "the ſecret mover of the coun-"cils of the King of England," which, at this period, were equally calculated to enrage the Courts of Stockholm and Peterſburg, however inimical to each other; the firſt, by the violent and unjuſt retention of Bremen and Verden; and the laſt, "by making all the offers imagin-"able"—to uſe the words of Count Gyllenburg to Baron Goertz, Dec. 29, 1716—"to acquire "Bremen of the King of Sweden at the expence "of the Czar, who is to be the ſacrifice of that "acquiſition." And the Swediſh Ambaſſador elſewhere ſays, "that if the preliminary con-"cerning Bremen was ſettled, the Engliſh Mi-"niſters would be very well pleaſed to retrieve "the falſe ſtep they had made, by talking loud-"ly of the defenſive treaty between us, and by "perſuading the nation to give us the ſuccors "therein ſtipulated; they might, in that caſe,

"agree

" agree in relation to what ſhould be taken
" from the Czar by way of repriſal for the Swed-
" iſh loſſes in Germany."

In conſequence of the machinations of Sunderland, and the conſequent alienation of Stanhope from his former friends, an order was unexpectedly diſpatched (Nov. 1716) for the removal of Lord Townſhend from his office. This was accompanied by a ſoftening letter from Secretary Stanhope, announcing his Lordſhip's advancement to the Viceroyalty of Ireland, and lamenting that the impracticability of his Lordſhip's temper did not *permit* the King longer to continue him in his former poſt. Lord Townſhend in anger refuſing to accept his new appointment, and Mr. Walpole, Mr. Methuen, the Lords Orford, Cowper, &c. declaring their reſolution to retire with him, the alarm of the Court was excited, and on the return of the King (Jan. 1717) the moſt ſpecious apologies were made by Stanhope and Sunderland for their paſt conduct; and the King himſelf condeſcended to acknowledge to Townſhend in perſon that he had been impoſed upon by falſe reports. Moved by theſe flattering inſtances of regard, and juſtly apprehenſive of the conſequences of a quarrel amongſt the Whigs,

Townſhend

Townſhend relinquiſhed his intention of retiring from public life, accepted the Government of Ireland, and a general reconciliation ſeemed to take place. But the good underſtanding between the different members of Adminiſtration did not long continue. The King's profeſſions of favor to Townſhend and Walpole appeared wholly fallacious; the confidence of the King being evidently confined to the Lords Sunderland and Stanhope. New diviſions took place; the ſupport given by Townſhend and Walpole to the meaſures of Government was cold and formal. Sunderland had, by unremitted exertions, greatly increaſed his parliamentary intereſt. It was thought that a Whig Adminiſtration might be formed without the aid of Lord Townſhend and his adherents: Sunderland and Stanhope, therefore, no longer wiſhed to poſtpone his diſmiſſion, which took place immediately on the debate relative to the motion of ſupply, as related in the narrative. But a ſtrong effort was made to gain over Walpole to the party of the Court; his parliamentary talents and knowledge of finance being now very conſpicuous. The King repeatedly refuſed to accept his reſignation, and urged, in the ſtrongeſt terms, his continuance in office. At the cloſe of the conference both the King and the Miniſter were obſerved

ſerved to be extremely agitated; but though the proſpect was highly tempting to his ambition, the fidelity of Walpole to his engagements remained unſhaken.

The conqueror of Almanara now, to the aſtoniſhment of his former military aſſociates, put on the gown of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sunderland, the life and ſoul of the new Adminiſtration, was conſtituted Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr. Addiſon ſucceeded Mr. Methuen as the other Secretary; the Earl of Berkeley was placed at the head of the Admiralty, in the room of the Earl of Orford; the Duke of Bolton was appointed Lord Lieutenant of Ireland; and the Duke of Kingſton Privy Seal—the laſt office vacated by the Earl of Sunderland, who was now regarded as Firſt Miniſter.

The treaty with Denmark, by which Bremen and Verden were ceded to Hanover, and the King of Great Britain agreed in conſequence to declare war againſt Sweden, was concluded July 1715, when Townſhend and Walpole were in the plenitude of their power, not merely with their acquieſcence, but with the warm approbation at leaſt of Lord Townſhend; the two brothers

brothers voluntarily incurring the reproach and reſponſibility of the innumerable miſchiefs which enſued from that fatal meaſure; which, indeed, was by Townſhend vindicated to the lateſt hour of his official exiſtence. M. Slingelandt, afterwards Penſionary of Holland, in a confidential letter to that nobleman, dated March 10th 1717, excellently ſays: "As much as the crown "of Great Britain is ſuperior to the electoral "cap, ſo much is the King intereſted to ſacri- "fice Bremen and Verden for a peace, rather "than continue any longer in a war." But Townſhend, in anſwer, profeſſes his opinion, "that, without any partiality to the pretenſions "of the King, but ſimply with a view to the "intereſts of Great Britain and Holland, Swe- "den muſt not be ſuffered to retain any longer "thoſe gates of the Empire, which, *ſince the* "*peace of Weſtphalia*, ſhe has never made uſe of "but for the purpoſe of introducing confuſion "and diſorder, or of turning Germany from the "purſuit of its true intereſts againſt France. "And (he adds) I lay it down as a principle, "that, for the advantage and tranquillity of "Europe, the King of Sweden ought to be de- "prived of thoſe provinces which have ſupplied "him with the means of doing ſo much miſ- "chief." But, admitting theſe obſervations to be

be as true as they are hiſtorically falſe, how were the gates of Bremen and Verden more dangerous than thoſe of Wiſmar and Stralſund? That Walpole, who at this time really acted, and at all times affected to act, a ſubordinate part in foreign affairs, ever declared himſelf explicitly in favor of this invidious and dangerous uſurpation, does not appear. But Horace Walpole, in his well-known pamphlet, ſtyled "The In-" tereſt of Great Britain ſteadily purſued," has expatiated on the ſubject, and zealouſly defended the policy of this moſt unjuſt purchaſe. "It is the intereſt of this country," he affirms, "that thoſe two provinces, which command the "navigation of the Elbe and the Weſer, the "only inlets from the Britiſh ſeas into Ger-"many, and which, in caſe of any diſturbance "in the North, are moſt capable of protecting "or interrupting the Britiſh trade to Ham-"burgh, ſhould rather be annexed to the King's "electoral dominions, than remain in the hands "of the King of Denmark, who has frequently "formed pretenſions on that city; or of Swe-"den, who has moleſted our commerce in the "Baltic." That it was of any political moment for Great Britain to contend to what continental power Bremen and Verden ſhould belong, is an extravagance which would never have

have been heard or thought of, had not the Elector of Hanover unfortunately worn the crown of Britain. But that an oppoſition of political principle entered into this memorable conteſt between the Whig Miniſters of George I. and that Townſhend and Walpole were not willing to go the ſame unwarrantable lengths to gratify the King's Germanic predilections, which the political profligacy of Sunderland and the grateful attachment of Stanhope prompted them to adopt, is ſufficiently evident, not to ſpeak of anterior evidence, from the general tenor of the correſpondence recently publiſhed: and it now remains to explain the chief cauſes of the difference ſubſiſting between them reſpecting the ſyſtem of continental politics.

Certain it is, that Lord Townſhend originally encouraged the idea which the King entertained of cultivating a ſtrict union with France, in oppoſition to the opinion of Sunderland, and even of Stanhope. But a defenſive alliance having been concluded with the Court of Vienna (May 1716), that Miniſter had now entirely changed his ſyſtem, conceiving the French alliance in preſent circumſtances to be unneceſſary and unadviſable. In the remonſtrance framed by the Cabinet Miniſters previous to the King's viſit to the

the continent, we find the following remarkable expreſſions:—" Neither can any doubt be made " but that the Regent of France, who has " hitherto left no engine unemployed to defeat " our alliance with the Emperor, and whoſe " principal aim ſeems to be to gain time for " putting in execution the deſigns he has form- " ed againſt his Majeſty, will eagerly lay hold " on ſuch an opportunity to diſtract the King's " affairs, either by ſupporting and encouraging " the Jacobites in ſome attempt here, or by " amuſing us with ſpecious and inſidious propo- " ſals," &c. And Mr. Poyntz, ſecretary to Lord Townſhend, declares, in a letter to General Stanhope, Aug. 1716, " that his Majeſty " knew that Lord Townſhend had long been " of opinion, that any farther engagements with " the Regent, particularly with reſpect to the " *ſucceſſion*, would only ſerve to ſtrengthen the " Regent, and to put it in his power to do the " King greater miſchief." But the King—who entertained higher and juſter ideas of the honor and ſincerity of the Regent, who knew that the Emperor regarded his new acquiſitions of territory in Germany with a jealous eye, that he had mortally offended the adverſe Crowns of Ruſſia and Sweden, that Denmark was a feeble and inefficient friend, and Pruſſia a ſecret and dangerous

dangerous enemy—was anxious to ſecure the ſupport of France. Several delays, ariſing merely from accidental cauſes, concurred to protract the ſignature of the treaty, which the King was perſuaded by Lord Sunderland to aſcribe to the duplicity of Townſhend, who had been informed by letter from Stanhope, Oct. 9th, "that "the ſituation of affairs in the North made "it abſolutely neceſſary to cloſe with France." And, Nov. 11th, Stanhope, by the expreſs command of the King, wrote to Townſhend to haſten the ſignature, cenſuring him in terms not very ceremonious for the repeated delays that had taken place as the effect of deſign and management. This letter of Stanhope was accompanied by another from Sunderland, written in a ſtyle of ſingular inſolence, and ſufficiently indicating the high favor and confidence to which he had now attained with the King. He acknowledges "that he was originally adverſe "to this alliance, but *upon his arrival at Hanover* "he was entirely convinced that no treaty "could be more glorious, nor more advantage-"ous, under the circumſtances Europe was "likely to be in through the proceedings of the "Czar," &c. He declares "that from his con-"cern for the King's ſervice, he muſt be plain "enough to ſay, that Lord Townſhend's con-

"duct

" duct wants to be explained, and that he " never ſaw the King reſent any thing ſo much " as the delays reſpecting the ſignature; his " Majeſty thinking not only Mr. Secretary Stan- " hope but himſelf not well uſed in that affair. " I muſt not too," ſays he, " omit acquainting " your Lordſhip, that the King is very much " ſurpriſed at the ſtrange notion that ſeems at " preſent to prevail, as if the Parliament was " not to concern themſelves in any thing that " happens in theſe parts of the world, which " he looks upon as not only expoſing him to all " kinds of affronts, but even to ruin; and in- " deed this notion is nothing but the old Tory " one, that England can ſubſiſt by itſelf, what- " ever becomes of the reſt of Europe, which " has been ſo juſtly exploded ever ſince the Re- " volution."

The aſtoniſhment of Lord Townſhend on receiving this impertinent extra-official letter, and his reſentment at the conduct of his friend Secretary Stanhope, in ſuffering it to accompany his own, were equally great. He immediately wrote a very ample vindication of his conduct to the King, who *appeared* to be ſatisfied with it. This he incloſed to Stanhope, declaring " his " heart to be ſo full with the thoughts of hav-

" ing received ſuch uſage from him to whom he " had been always ſo faithful a friend, that he " could ſay no more at that time." To Lord Sunderland he did not deign any anſwer. But though the charge of intentional delay in this buſineſs appears to have been unfounded, it was abundantly clear that Townſhend and Walpole did not coincide with the Hanoverian Cabinet in their general ſyſtem of politics. While Sunderland and Stanhope were willing to run all hazards for the preſervation of Bremen and Verden, Townſhend and Walpole were anxious for the preſervation of peace, and the cultivation of a good underſtanding with the Emperor. On the 25th of September, Secretary Stanhope wrote an extraordinary diſpatch to Lord Townſhend, informing him " that the King of Den- " mark was under the greateſt apprehenſions " from the attempts of the Czar, then with his " fleet in the vicinity of Copenhagen, and who " had declared that he would quarter his troops " in the Daniſh territories." Sir John Norris was at this time with a Britiſh ſquadron in the Baltic; and Stanhope goes on to ſay, " that M. " Bernſtorf thought it neceſſary to cruſh the " Czar immediately, to ſecure his ſhips, and " even to ſeize his perſon, to be kept till his " troops ſhall have evacuated Denmark and " Germany."

" Germany." Far from being ſtartled at this wild and deſperate propoſal, Stanhope profeſſes himſelf " in his nature ever inclined to bold " ſtrokes. But," ſays he, " the truth is, I ſee " no *day-light* through theſe affairs. We may " eaſily maſter the Czar if we go briſkly to " work, and this be thought a right meaſure; " but how far Sweden may be thereby enabled " to diſturb us in Britain, you muſt judge. The " King now wiſhes, and ſo doth your humble " ſervant very heartily, that we had ſecured " France." Lord Townſhend, after conſulting no doubt with his friend Mr. Walpole, wrote immediately and in the utmoſt confidence a few lines, which he deſires may remain a ſecret for ever. He conjures Stanhope " not to conſent " to Sir John Norris's remaining in the Baltic " beyond the 1ſt of November, nor to the " King's engaging openly in the affair about " the Czar. This Northern War," he declares, " will be their ruin. Is it poſſible," ſays he, " for the King to carry it on with only " Denmark on his ſide, ſuppoſing even the intended project ſhould ſucceed? Would it " not, therefore, be right for the King to think " immediately how to make his peace with " Sweden, even though he ſhould be obliged " to make ſome *ſacrifice* in obtaining it?" And

in his public diſpatch as Secretary, he ſtates at large his reaſons why a rupture with Ruſſia would be fatal to the intereſts of Great Britain; and concludes with giving it as the opinion of all thoſe who have the honor to be employed in his Majeſty's ſervice, that the King's taking any farther ſtep in favor of Denmark would be attended with inſuperable difficulties; the leaſt of which might be, that the whole of the war againſt Sweden as well as Muſcovy would be devolved upon his Majeſty.

The change of ſentiment in Townſhend and Walpole relative to the French alliance admits of an eaſy ſolution. While the object of it was defenſive, and calculated merely to prevent the Jacobite party from receiving any ſupport from France, it was highly rational. But when it was relied upon as the means of offence, and operated as an encouragement to perſevere in the frantic ſchemes of the Hanoverian Cabinet, it appeared to them impolitic and odious. In a ſubſequent letter, October 16, Lord Townſhend complains to Secretary Stanhope "that "the miſerable and diſtracted condition into "which the Northern affairs are plunged, gives "the diſcontented and enemies of the King's "government hopes that they may be able to

"raiſe

" raiſe ſome diſturbances in Parliament on that " head; and," he adds, " your humble ſervant " and yourſelf, as I am credibly informed, are " to ſuffer in this attack, though, God knows, " we have had no direction in all this Nor- " thern quarrel." Strongly ſuſpecting never-theleſs, or rather being now fully appriſed of Stanhope's recent converſion, he admoniſhes his friend " that the expecting any money from the " Parliament towards carrying on that war is a " mere deluſion, and can end in nothing but " breaking the King's friends amongſt them- " ſelves, ruining the public credit, and pre- " venting us from getting into a method of " paying the nation's debts."

Mr. Walpole had given offence to the King, not merely by his entire coincidence in theſe ſentiments, but by his pertinacious refuſal to make Parliamentary proviſion for certain troops hired by the Hanoverian Miniſters of Munſter and Saxe-Gotha. And Horace Walpole, at this time Envoy at the Hague, ſpeaks in a diſ-patch to England, dated October 10, of " the " confuſion the affairs of the North are at pre- " ſent in. The letters which the meſſenger car- " ries," ſays he, " will bring you an account " how extremely frighted our Miniſters at Ha-

" nover are, and indeed with very good rea-
" ſon." And, October 21, he ſays " that a
" meſſenger had arrived that morning with re-
" peated orders for him and Lord Cadogan to
" ſign with the Abbé Dubois; and the only
" reaſon that I find for it is," ſays this Mi-
niſter, " leaſt the Czar ſhould become maſter
" of Mecklenburg. I cannot for my life ſee
" why the whole ſyſtem of affairs in Europe,
" eſpecially in relation to the intereſt of Eng-
" land, muſt be entirely ſubverted on account
" of Mecklenburg. God knows what will be
" the conſequence of ſuch politics." So *ſtea-
dily*, in the opinion of this dextrous courtier,
were the intereſts of Great Britain at this time
purſued. The King, enraged at the continued
oppoſition in the Engliſh Cabinet to the ſyſtem
of Hanover, withdrew entirely his confidence
from Lord Townſhend, while Sunderland and
Stanhope roſe daily higher, and were each mo-
ment more firmly fixed in the royal favor.

But another cauſe of diſſatisfaction and reſent-
ment on the part of the King was the court
which the Engliſh Miniſters paid to the Prince
of Wales, who, though conſtituted Regent
during the abſence of his father, poſſeſſed lit-
tle ſhare of his paternal affection and regard;
and

and who upon all occaſions affected to ſet himſelf at the head of a party in oppoſition to the Court. At the firſt Townſhend and Walpole were treated by the Prince with extreme reſerve and *hauteur*; but by degrees ſo good an underſtanding prevailed between them, as to excite the utmoſt jealouſy on the part of the Sovereign. And (2d November) a diſpatch was penned by Lord Townſhend to Secretary Stanhope, which ſo irritated the King, that the immediate removal of that Miniſter would probably have been the conſequence, had not the firſt emotions of his anger been counteracted by the ſuggeſtions of Sunderland and Stanhope. The diſpatch ſtated, "that by command of his "Royal Highneſs a meeting of the Lords of "the Council had been held, to conſider what "heads of buſineſs might be proper and neceſ-"ſary to be laid before Parliament." After mentioning the correſpondence of Goertz and Gyllenburg, he declares the Lords to be unanimouſly of opinion, that, conſidering the obſtinacy and inveteracy of the King of Sweden, the poverty and weakneſs of the Court of Denmark, the treachery and corruption of Pruſſia, and the little probability there is of any cordial and effectual aſſiſtance from the Emperor at this juncture, there is ſcarce any proſpect

leſt of the King's extricating himſelf out of the difficulties into which Northern affairs have plunged him, without coming to a better underſtanding with the Czar—that encouragement ſhould be given to him to purſue vigorouſly his views againſt Sweden, and that upon no account ſhould the ſquadron under Sir John Norris be permitted to winter in the Baltic. The diſpatch repreſents the nation as ſet upon reducing the forces, and upon eaſing themſelves of the burden of taxes; "ſtating it as, in their "Lordſhips opinion, abſolutely neceſſary for the "King's ſervice, that the Prince of Wales and "the Miniſters in England ſhould be veſted with "full diſcretionary powers to conduct the bu-"ſineſs here treated of in Parliament, agree-"ably to the preſent proſpect of affairs, in caſe "his Majeſty does not return in time to open "the Seſſion in perſon." This was conſidered as equivalent to aſking for powers to defeat the King's projects in that very aſſembly where alone they could be ſupported with effect; and the breach between the Engliſh and the Hanoverian Miniſters became from this moment unavoidable and irreparable. The King had been flattered with the belief "that it might not be "impoſſible"—to uſe the words of Stanhope to Lord Townſhend, October 16—"to put this

"Northern

"Northern buſineſs in ſuch a light as may in-
"duce the Parliament not to look upon it with
"indifference." He declared that no time ſhould be loſt in trying to concert meaſures "with the Dutch, for that if the Czar be *let* "*alone* three years he will be abſolute maſter "in the Baltic." During the ſtay of Horace Walpole, who was himſelf the bearer of Lord Townſhend's laſt diſpatch, appearances were, notwithſtanding the extreme reſentment of the Court of Herenhauſen, ſedulouſly preſerved; but three days after his departure, orders were ſent for the removal of Lord Townſhend. Theſe were accompanied by a letter from Secretary Stanhope to Mr. Walpole, in which he expreſſes his "hope and deſire that he would en-
"deavour to reconcile Lord Townſhend to the "alteration that had taken place. The King," he ſays, "will no longer bear him in the office "of Secretary be the conſequence what it will. "Is the Whig intereſt," he aſks, "to be ſtaked in "defence of ſuch a pretenſion? or is the differ-
"ence to the Whig party whether Lord Town-
"ſhend be Secretary or Lord Lieutenant of "Ireland *tanti?*" There is little doubt of the ſincerity of Stanhope in wiſhing Lord Townſhend to accept; for ſuch acceptance muſt be conſtrued as an acquieſcence in his own political defeat. Stanhope and Sunderland would of courſe

courſe ſucceed to the chief direction of affairs, and the Hanoverian ſyſtem would at leaſt not be oppoſed by Townſhend and his friends if they retained their places and preferments: nevertheleſs, Stanhope plainly avows, that if Townſhend and Walpole determine after all to relinquiſh their poſts, they may be ſupplied, and that the King's affairs may ſtill go on without their aſſiſtance. "In this caſe," ſays he, "the King hath engaged Lord Sunderland and "myſelf to promiſe that his Lordſhip will be "Secretary, and that I, unable and unequal as "I am every way, ſhould be Chancellor of the "Exchequer—the King declaring that as long "as he can find Whigs that will ſerve him, he "will be ſerved by them." Lord Townſhend peremptorily declined, in a handſome letter to the King, the Government of Ireland, and Walpole, in anſwer to Stanhope, proteſted that ſome parts of his letter aſtoniſhed him ſo much, that he knew not what to ſay or think. "What "could prevail on you," ſays he, "to enter into "ſuch a ſcheme as this, and appear to be chief "actor in it, and undertake to carry it through "in all events, without which it could not have "been undertaken, is unaccountable. I ſwear "that Lord Townſhend has no way deſerved "it of you. Believe me, Stanhope, he never "thought you could enter into a combination

"againſt

" againſt him. Conſidering all the circumſtan-
" ces and manner of doing this, nobody could
" adviſe him to accept of the Lieutenancy of
" Ireland, and it cannot be ſuppoſed that the
" authors of this ſcheme either thought he
" would or deſired he ſhould."

Stanhope, however, ſtill continued to urge, in amicable and conciliatory terms, the propriety and neceſſity of this acceptance, in order to prevent a fatal diſunion among the Whigs; and as a ſalvo for the honor of the King, " I " hope," ſays he, in his letter to Walpole, January 1ſt 1717, " that you will grow cooler " on your ſide—that even my Lord Townſhend " will ſacrifice his reſentment to the public " good:" and January 16, from the Hague, he writes, " I muſt and do, for the King's ſake, " for that of the Whigs, and of my Lord Town-" ſhend himſelf, moſt earneſtly repeat to you " my entreaties that you will diſpoſe my Lord " Townſhend to accept the offer of Ireland. " I am at liberty to aſſure you in the King's " name, that when my Lord Townſhend ſhall " have accepted of Ireland, if in ſix months, " or in a twelvemonth, he ſhould like better " ſome other poſt at home in the Cabinet " Council, that his Majeſty will very readily " approve of any ſcheme that his ſervants ſhall

" concert

" concert for placing Lord Townſhend where " he ſhall like." He concludes with ſaying, " I have, dear Walpole, a very clear con- " ſcience ; and whilſt I am conſcious to my- " ſelf of well doing, I have learnt to be very " eaſy in mind whatever other people think of " me." That Stanhope, a man of great and acknowledged probity and ſincerity of character, upon the whole meant honeſtly and well, cannot be doubted. He was alarmed at the dangerous conſequences of the precipitate ſtep which had been taken, and wiſhed to prevent the miſchief going farther. The Court Whigs in general, though offended at the rude diſmiſſion of Lord Townſhend, preſſed that Nobleman to accede to the propoſition now made. The Penſionary Heinſius and other leading men in Holland, joined their intreaties to thoſe of the friends of both parties in England. The King himſelf on his arrival condeſcended to apologiſe to him for whatever ſteps had been taken to his prejudice, and acknowledged that he had been deceived. Lord Townſhend, unable to reſiſt theſe united importunities, at length accepted the Vice-royalty, and remaining in England, aſſiſted as uſual at the deliberations of the Cabinet. But cordiality and friendſhip were for ever extinguiſhed. To uſe the language of a Courtier of thoſe times, Mr. Brere-

ton,

ton, "the difference between the two parties "was regarded as a trial between the Engliſh "and German Councils." And in a very few weeks, as before related, the ſecond diſmiſſion of Lord Townſhend took place, which was followed by the reſignation of the Walpoles, Mr. Secretary Methuen, Mr. Pulteney, the Earl of Orford, the Duke of Devonſhire, &c. and, after an interval of apparent perplexity and increaſing diſcontent, of the Lord Chancellor Cowper, a nobleman of great eloquence, addreſs, and popularity.

Lord Townſhend bore his fall from power with temper and dignity; but a fixed mutual reſentment and averſion from this time ſubſiſted between Stanhope and Walpole, which, upon one occaſion, broke out in an altercation and reciprocal crimination in the Houſe of Commons, ſo vehement that the Houſe was obliged to interpoſe its authority, in order to prevent any diſaſtrous conſequences. And Mr. Hungerford obſerved, "that it became the Members of that "Houſe, after the Oriental faſhion, to avert "their countenances, while theſe two great men, "the fathers of the State, were thus expoſing "each other's nakedneſs." It is probable that General Stanhope was not, on ſubſequent reflection, perfectly ſatisfied with his own conduct.

According

According to an anecdote related by Profeſſor Whiſton, of this military Stateſman, after remaining a long time one day in a muſing poſture, he ſuddenly exclaimed in a kind of agony, "Now I am convinced that a man cannot ſet "his foot over the threſhold of a Court, but "he muſt become a rogue." It may be remarked in a few words, as a ſtriking ſequel to this minute, perhaps tedious, detail, that after the diſgrace of Sunderland, and the death of Stanhope, no ſhadow of competition remaining, Townſhend and Walpole were reinveſted with the full powers of Government. But ſcarcely had they attained the ſummit of their wiſhes before a violent jealouſy aroſe between theſe quondam friends; and the influence of Walpole at length prevailing, Lord Townſhend, after a long protracted ſtruggle, reſigned his offices, and retired to his eſtates in Norfolk, where he paſſed his remaining years, without once viſiting the Metropolis, highly reſpected; amuſing himſelf and benefiting the country around him with his agricultural experiments; to which there is an alluſion in one of Pope's epiſtolary imitations of Horace,

"All Townſhend's *turnips*, and all Groſvenor's mines."

ON

THE TREATY OF HANOVER,

CONCLUDED A. D. 1725.

THE Treaty of Hanover was more than half a century ago ſtyled by Lord Cheſterfield, in reply to the famous pamphlet of Horace Walpole, its chief negotiator, whom he humorouſly ſtyles Monſieur-Balance, "that univerſal-"ly exploded treaty." That it originated in German views, German hopes, and German fears, is indeed ſo evident to thoſe who are converſant in the hiſtory of the times, and is ſo clearly demonſtrated by a vaſt multiplicity of papers, tracts, ſpeeches, and other documents, that the real and only difficulty now ariſes in ſelecting and arranging the proofs that exiſt, ſo as to exhibit them in a conciſe and ſtriking point of view; for to enter into tedious

dious and elaborate diſcuſſions, intereſting only to a few political ſpeculatiſts, would be mere waſte of time and paper. In the Narrative the leading facts alone are ſtated, and Mr. Horace Walpole's own comment upon them, and the reader is left to draw the proper concluſions. This has the appearance at leaſt of candor and caution. Yet has the Hiſtory of the Houſe of Brunſwick been ſtigmatized by a late writer, the Rev. W. Coxe, in his Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, as uncandid, careleſs, ſuperficial, and even as uniformly factious and *malignant*. And the utmoſt indulgence which this arrogant Critic can allow is, that the Hiſtorian has been "miſled by the eloquence of Pul-"teney, the ſpecioufneſs of Cheſterfield, and the "ſophiſtry of Bolingbroke."

With reſpect to the celebrated Treaty of Hanover, in particular, Mr. Coxe has the boldneſs, in the face of the evidence which he himſelf has produced, to affirm, "that there has been "no event ſince the acceſſion of the Houſe of "Brunſwick in which the intereſts of Hanover "were more ſacrificed to thoſe of England than "in this very treaty, which then raiſed ſuch an "outcry againſt the Walpole Adminiſtration, "and which ſtill affords a theme for *political ob-*"*loquy*."

"*loquy.*" The ſtrength of his aſſertions are no doubt to compenſate for the weakneſs of his reaſonings. 1ſt. He tells us, "that the object of "the treaty was to obtain the abolition of the "Oſtend Company, and to counteract the at- "tempts which the Emperor, Spain, and Ruſſia, "were accuſed of carrying on in favor of the "Pretender." As to the abolition of the Oſtend Company, it was ſo palpably a pretext to cover the deſigns of the Court, that the very mention of it is at this time perfectly ridiculous. Admitting, however, for the ſake of argument, the abolition of this obnoxious Company to have been a great national object, was it fit or proper to aim at its accompliſhment, by ſetting the Emperor at defiance, and combining with half the Powers of Europe againſt him? With regard to the project ſaid to be concerted by the two Imperial Courts, in conjunction with Spain, for placing the Pretender upon the Throne of Great Britain, it will readily be admitted, that dangerous deſigns were in agitation, which it was doubtleſs neceſſary to counteract. But how did thoſe hoſtile deſigns originate on the part of the Imperial and Spaniſh Courts? How, but from the multiplied cauſes of offence given for a long ſeries of years by the King of England to thoſe great and powerful Courts?

It is not pretended that the Treaty of Hanover, conſidered merely as a part of the Hanoverian ſyſtem, was an abſurd or impolitic meaſure. It evidently behoved the Britiſh Government to guard againſt the deſigns of thoſe, who, incited by the moſt wanton and flagrant provocations, had become our enemies. But the general political ſyſtem of which the Treaty of Hanover was an eſſential part, and a neceſſary conſequence, labors under the indelible reproach of being a moſt pernicious, unjuſt, and prepoſterous ſyſtem; and in that view only was the Treaty in queſtion ever regarded by any enlightened or equitable perſon, as the proper ſubject of political reprobation, ſo that Mr. Coxe intirely miſtakes the very ground which forms the baſis of the queſtion. And this is again abundantly manifeſt from the ſecond argument which he adduces, to prove that the Treaty of Hanover was a Treaty in which the intereſts of Great Britain were ſteadily purſued, viz.—"that it was contrary to the "intereſts of the Electorate, to the opinions "and remonſtrances of the German Miniſters, "and even to the inclination of the King." All this may be, and indeed appears to be, very true, but Mr. Coxe's concluſion is not the leſs abſurd. When it is ſo repeatedly ſaid, that

"the

" the helm of the Britiſh Government was ſteer-
" ed by the Hanoverian rudder," it is not meant that the intereſts of the good people of that Electorate were ever conſulted in the political meaſures adopted by the Court of Herenhauſen, but the perſonal aggrandizement of the Elector. The diſinclination of the King aroſe not from any latent attachment to the intereſts of Great Britain, but, as Mr. Coxe himſelf acknowledges, " from a dread of being put under the
" ban of the Empire." The intereſts of the Electorate, as diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of the Elector, were no doubt ſacrificed, becauſe in conſequence of the Treaty the country was in danger of immediate invaſion; and the King's German Miniſters, who dare not open their mouths on the ſubject of Bremen and Verden, might well be allowed to exclaim, " that
" the King was expoſing his Hanoverian do-
" minions for the ſake of a few branches of
" the Engliſh trade." In their ſolicitude to effect an accommodation with the Emperor, they forcibly felt the injuſtice and abſurdity of the Engliſh claims reſpecting Oſtend. That the Treaty of Hanover, in one view, was neceſſary to the intereſts of England, and in another view hoſtile to the intereſts of Hanover; and yet that it was juſtly liable to the ſevereſt animad-

verſion, as originating in a ſyſtem moſt ruinous and fatal, is a paradox of which the genius of Mr. Coxe appears unequal to the ſolution. But, not to notice farther the weak and futile reaſonings of this ſelf-conceited and ſelf-confuted writer on this topic, it may not be improper to embrace the opportunity which now offers, to ſtate ſomewhat more at large, than the nature of a general hiſtory would allow, a variety of particulars in confirmation of the uniform tenor of the narrative;—not ſurely from motives of "*malignity*," or even of idle petulance, but from a real and earneſt wiſh to infuſe more widely rational ideas of policy into the minds of men, and to induce them with greater vigilance to guard againſt the artful and inſidious deſigns of ambitious and unprincipled politicians, who pretend to conſult "ſteadily and invariably" the welfare and advantage of the country, while their meaſures are framed and calculated only to create confuſion and diſcord, to ſpread wide the flames and to perpetuate the horrors of war.

The policy of the Engliſh Government, at the acceſſion of George I. was ſimple and obvious. All the leading Powers of Europe were at this period diſpoſed to maintain the relations of peace

peace and amity with the Crown of Great Britain. The power and proſperity of the nation were very great, and its reputation ſtood proportionably high; the projects of the Jacobites had been completely diſconcerted by the death of the Queen; the new Monarch had been received with general acclamation; a mild and liberal conduct at home, combined with an equitable and generous policy abroad, was alone wanting to make England the arbitreſs of Europe. By errors the moſt groſs and fatal, in a ſhort time the King of England found himſelf ſurrounded with an hoſt of foreign and domeſtic enemies, and he boldly launched himſelf and the nation on "a ſea of troubles," eſcaping political ſhipwreck through the unmerited favor of fortune, much more than by any efforts of virtue or of wiſdom.

Mr. Coxe has on the contrary affirmed, with a view, doubtleſs, to evade theſe conſequences, "that no Prince ever aſcended a throne in more "critical circumſtances, and with leſs appear-"ance of a quiet reign, than George I." Memoirs of Walpole, Vol. I. p. 51. And to ſupport this aſſertion, he takes a general ſurvey of the ſituation of the different continental Powers, ſerving only to diſcover his exceſſive ignorance

of the political ſtate of Europe at that period, as a few curſory remarks will abundantly ſuffice to ſhow. Though an eager deſire to end his days in peace was the moſt ſtriking characteriſtic of the latter years of Louis XIV. Mr. Coxe repreſents that Monarch, contrary to all evidence and all credibility, at ſeventy-ſeven years of age, "as waiting and watching for a favorable "opportunity of pouring in the whole force of "France to promote the reſtoration of the "Pretender." The Emperor Charles VI. who had actually offered, through the medium of Count Konigſeg, his Ambaſſador, any number of troops that might be wanting to ſecure the Hanoverian ſucceſſion, Mr. Coxe ſays "may be fairly "*ſuppoſed* rather inimical than otherwiſe to the "intereſts of George I. whoſe growing influ- "ence in Germany he watched with a jealous "circumſpection." Whereas all the cauſes of jealouſy aroſe ſubſequent to the Acceſſion, and the Elector was regarded as a Prince ſo unambitious, that Mr. Coxe himſelf informs us, "he was believed to be indifferent to his own "elevation to the Throne of Britain." From theſe motives, and a fear of offending the Pretender, Mr. Coxe tells us, "that the Emperor "refuſed to guarantee the Proteſtant ſucceſſion "at the peace of Raſtadt," though it is notorious

rious that this refuſal proceeded entirely from his reſentment at the recent conduct of the Engliſh Court, whoſe interference at the Treaty of Raſtadt he would not ſuffer in any ſhape whatever. No umbrage at this refuſal was ever expreſſed by the Court of Herenhauſen, which knew and approved the reſentment of the Court of Vienna, whoſe guarantee of the Brunſwick ſucceſſion was granted early in the new reign, without the leaſt difficulty; and George I. notwithſtanding their ſubſequent political differences, always retained a high perſonal regard for the Emperor. In a diſpatch from M. Pozobueno, the Spaniſh Ambaſſador, to the Duc de Ripperda, May 1726, he ſays, "Beſides theſe "ſubjects of diſquiet, the King of England feels "no leſs chagrin in having loſt the confidence "of the Emperor, whom he ſo much loves "and eſteems."

Mr. Coxe farther aſſures us, "that the Em-"peror well knew the party in England which "favored the acceſſion of the Houſe of Brunſ-"wick to be extremely weak." This is, indeed, intelligence extraordinary; for during the whole of the reigns of King William and Queen Anne, as we learn from all the hiſtories of thoſe times, without exception, the ſecurity of the Pro-

teſtant ſucceſſion in the Brunſwick line was the grand idol of the Engliſh nation, which was alſo indefatigable in its endeavors to eſtabliſh the ſame order of ſucceſſion in Scotland; nor were the Jacobites able, in a ſingle inſtance, to reſiſt the meaſures alternately brought forward by the Whigs and Tories for the attainment of that great political object. The Act of Settlement itſelf was the act of a Tory Miniſtry and a Tory Parliament; and the mere ſuſpicion of a deſign entertained by the laſt Tory Adminiſtration of Queen Anne to ſubvert that ſucceſſion, though contradicted by their public conduct as well as their public profeſſions, threw the nation into a flame, and the King ultimately ſucceeded to the Crown, not only without oppoſition, but with univerſal applauſe and acclamation: it was the ſubſequent perſecution of the Tories which loſt him the affections of half his ſubjects. Mr. Coxe, indeed, ſpeaking of the general perſuaſion of the Whigs, "that "Harley and Bolingbroke, had not the death of "the Queen prevented their ſchemes, would "have ſet aſide the Act of Settlement, and in-"troduced a Popiſh Sovereign on the throne" (Memoirs, p. 69), adds, "it muſt be *confeſſed* "that documents, now become public, place "theſe facts in ſo clear a light, as to render "them

"them abſolutely incontrovertible." But, as we are ſtill left in ignorance, in what collection of ſtate papers or public library theſe "public documents" are to be found, Mr. Coxe's own aſſertion, or *confeſſion of faith*, will do very little towards removing the incredulity of political unbelievers. This conviction was, in Mr. Coxe himſelf, a very recent one; for, twenty pages only previous to the above obſervation, he affirms of Lord Oxford, "that the ſchemes of "the Pretender's partizans, for the repeal of the "Act of Settlement, were directly over-ruled "or indirectly counteracted by that nobleman, "who, notwithſtanding his junction with the "Jacobites, for the *ſole purpoſe* of making a "peace, and maintaining his ground againſt "the Whigs, does not appear ever to have "wiſhed to fruſtrate the proviſions of the Act "of Settlement." And of his celebrated colleague in office he ſays, "To attempt to fa-"thom the politics and unqueſtionably trace "the deſigns of the artful and unprincipled Bo-"lingbroke, would be difficult even at this time, "when party prejudicies have ſubſided, and "when many lights have been thrown upon "his conduct." It is perhaps hardly worth while to remark, that Mr. Coxe (Memoirs, p. 199) again contradicts himſelf, and affirms, that

that " notwithſtanding Lord Bolingbroke's poſi-
" tive aſſurances to Sir Wm. Wyndham, it is
" now aſcertained beyond the ſmalleſt doubt,
" that Bolingbroke had entered deeply into the
" deſigns formed at the cloſe of the Queen's
" reign, for the reſtoration of the Pretender,"
declaring " the whole plan and progreſs of this
" conſpiracy to be clearly and unequivocally
" detailed by Marſhal Berwick." But the Memoirs of this nobleman may be ſearched in vain for proofs of this aſſertion. After *detailing* the circumſtances which demonſtrated the hypocriſy of Oxford, he ſays (Vol. II. p. 192) " that they
" —*i. e.* the Jacobite party—exerted themſelves,
" and, by means of Lady Maſham, prevailed
" upon the Queen to remove the Lord High-
" Treaſurer, as it was not *poſſible* to conduct the
" affair properly while he remained in office;
" the *other Miniſters* did not doubt of being
" able to carry on their projects without oppoſi-
" tion:" *i. e.* the other Miniſters aſſured the Court of St. Germains, as Oxford before them had done, that they *did not doubt* of effecting the reſtoration of the pretended King, although Lord Bolingbroke was at this very time employed in framing a Bill, denouncing the penalties of high-treaſon againſt ſuch as ſhould enliſt or be enliſted in the ſervice of the Pretender,

tender, a price being alſo ſet upon his head by royal proclamation. The obvious policy both of Oxford and Bolingbroke was to amuſe the Jacobites, in order, conjunctly with the Tories, to ſecure a majority in Parliament. Bolingbroke was unqueſtionably poſſeſſed of greater talents than Oxford; he had more political courage, and proportionably leſs principle; ſo that there was juſt ground of alarm and apprehenſion, though there exiſts not the ſlighteſt proof of his having actually formed any fixed or ſerious deſign of ſubverting the Proteſtant ſucceſſion.

With reſpect to the ſingular notion entertained by Mr. Coxe, of the weakneſs of the Hanoverian party in England, the Duke of Berwick tells us (Memoirs, Vol. II. p. 194) that King George, on his arrival in London, was received with every poſſible demonſtration of joy. "It would have been an eaſy matter for him in "the beginning," ſays this great man, "to con-"ciliate the minds of the people; for this pur-"poſe he had nothing to do but to avoid "declaring for any *party*, and to look upon all "the Engliſh as being equally his ſubjects." And in regard to another opinion, peculiar to Mr. Coxe, "that Louis XIV. was waiting and "watching for an opportunity of pouring in

"the

" the whole force of France, to promote the re-
" ſtoration of the Pretender," the Duke of Berwick informs us, Vol. II. p. 193, " that, on the
" death of the Queen, the King of France ſent
" M. de Torcy to the Pretender, who had
" arrived *incognito* at Paris, to perſuade, and,
" if neceſſary, to compel him to return to his
" uſual reſidence at Bar, in Lorraine." And, even when diſcontent and diſaffection began to ſhew themſelves formidable in England, the French Monarch " perſiſted in his reſolution
" not to furniſh *any troops* for the expedition
" in contemplation." The reſolution of the Pretender to embark for Great Britain was diſapproved by him; and though ſanguine hopes were cheriſhed of aſſiſtance from Sweden, " Louis
" adhered," ſays M. Berwick, " ſtrictly to his
" firſt principle, and no argument was able to
" engage him to furniſh the ſuccors required," p. 203—10. " All being tired of war," ſays M. Berwick in a memorial addreſſed to the Court of St. Germains, " think only of living in peace,
" which nothing but abſolute neceſſity can in-
" duce any Prince to *break*." " The Duke of Or-
" leans," ſays Lord Stair, " owned that he knew
" of the Pretender's deſign, and that the King
" had been much preſſed to aſſiſt him, but had
" refuſed; that, however, the Pretender had re-
" ſolved

"ſolved to try his fortune, but he was well "aſſured his projects would come to nothing;" Hardwick State-Papers, Vol. II. p. 541*.

Will

* While theſe remarks were actually printing off, the Bolingbroke Papers recently publiſhed by Mr. Parke were tranſmitted to the writer by favor of a nobleman, whoſe knowledge of the hiſtory of this country is very accurate and extenſive. Theſe Papers contain the moſt demonſtrative proofs, that no ſuch plots and conſpiracies ever exiſted as Mr. Coxe, and other writers of the ſame claſs, have dreamed about. It may be added, that the nobleman to whom the writer owes this obligation, was on terms of the ſtricteſt intimacy with the late Earl of Orford; and though no leſs deſirous, probably, than Mr. Coxe, that juſtice ſhould be done to the memory of Sir Robert Walpole, he is far above the *literary arts* of riſking random aſſertions, adopting viſionary hypotheſes, or loading other perſons with unmerited reproach, for the purpoſe of concealing or palliating the failings of a great and dignified character.

The plain and evident truth is, that Lord Bolingbroke, a man of extraordinary talents, of ſtrong paſſions, of aſpiring views, little reſtrained by fear or principle, had thrown himſelf, without reſerve, into the arms of the Tory party. Perceiving himſelf the object of the dread and deteſtation of the Whigs, he ſoon contracted a reciprocal and implacable hatred againſt them; and, though entirely free from that miſerable taint of religious bigotry which characteriſed the genuine high-church faction, he was prompted, both by rancor and policy, to puſh things to extremity, in order at once to cruſh his enemies, and reanimate his friends, then newly riſing to popularity; adopting, from the neceſſity of his ſituation, though naturally open and generous in

his

Will Mr. Coxe ſtill maintain his *original poſitions?* This will indeed be an arduous taſk. Or

his diſpoſition, and daring in his infidelity, the hypocritical and contemptible cant of the church being in danger. He deſpiſed the indeciſive and myſterious policy of Oxford, and aimed, by the moſt vigorous and reſolute meaſures, to ſecure ſuch a permanent aſcendency to the Tories, as ſhould reduce the Whigs to a ſtate of political inſignificance, and compel the Court of Herenhauſen to abandon that favorite connexion. "The Queen "has it now in her power," he tells the Duke of Shrewſbury, then Ambaſſador at Paris (April 1713), "to eſtabliſh ſuch "a plan as ſhe may purſue for the reſt of her reign." And in another diſpatch, more explicitly, "I cannot help ſaying, in the "fullneſs of my ſoul, to your Grace, that if we do not eſtabliſh "*ourſelves*, and the true intereſt of our country, it is the Queen's "and Treaſurer's fault; the clamor of Jacobitiſm ſeems to be "the only reſource of our enemies." Had the Queen ſurvived a few years longer, the great political ability of Lord Bolingbroke, directed to this end, viz. the permanent aggrandizement of the Tories, would, in all probability, have been ultimately ſucceſsful. Since the fatal buſineſs of Sacheverel, the Tories were become the popular party; but the excellent underſtanding of Lord Bolingbroke could not fail to perceive, that any attempt to repeal the Act of Settlement muſt terminate in ruin; for, as the popularity of the Tories was founded in the prevailing folly, or rather madneſs, reſpecting the danger of the Church, a meaſure openly and avowedly calculated to pave the way for a Popiſh Pretender to the Throne, would inſtantly and inevitably transfer that popularity to the Whigs, who, as Lord Bolingbroke with his characteriſtic ingenuouſneſs remarks, "made "the ſame factious uſe of the *ſuppoſed danger* of the Proteſtant "ſucceſſion

Or will he acknowledge his ignorance and incompetency? This, after ſuch an oſtentatious parade

" ſucceſſion as the Tories had endeavoured to do of the *ſuppoſed* " *danger* of the Church." (Letter to Sir William Wyndham.) The general concluſions to be deduced from theſe obſervations, corroborated by the ſubſequent extracts promiſcuouſly ſelected from a moſt voluminous correſpondence, is, that Lord Bolingbroke was not guilty of the " treaſonous deſigns" attributed to him; that Sir Robert Walpole and his aſſociates acted in the ſpirit of party and not of patriotiſm in the impeachment of Lord Bolingbroke, and that the policy adopted by the new King was eſſentially erroneous, and equally incompatible with wiſdom and magnanimity. Upon all theſe topics Mr. Coxe decides very differently; but this anſwer to Mr. Coxe is not written for the purpoſe of perſonal or frivolous altercation. To confute Mr. Coxe is a poor triumph indeed; but it is of importance to confirm and ſtrengthen the leading poſitions in the hiſtory, in order to guard it againſt the attacks of more formidable aſſailants. Mr. Coxe is not, indeed, without his peculiar and diſtinctive ſpecies of merit; " commas and points he ſets exactly right," and knows better than any one whether a debate was poſtponed for a week or a month, and whether a particular queſtion was carried by a great majority, or without any diviſion.

In a letter from Mr. Prior, then reſident at Paris, to Lord Bolingbroke, dated Auguſt 1712, he ſays, " that the young " gentleman—*i. e.* the Pretender—is gone to Chalons very " melancholy, but much reſigned." In September, the Pretender being then at Bar, Mr. Prior remarks, " there is not " one thing that young man can do, nor one word he can ſay, " but will be told by Lorraine to the Emperor, and from that " Court

parade of knowledge, will be ſtill harder. It can afford no pleaſure to expoſe imbecility and

" Court will be communicated to the Whigs in England." This ſurely is ſufficient to clear the Duke of Lorraine from the charge of acting in concert and colluſion with the Court of London. In the month of February 1713 the Duke of Shrewſbury informs Lord Bolingbroke " that ſeveral Engliſh gentlemen of the St. " Germaine's Court have aſked to viſit him, among whom was " the Duke of Berwick, but he had let them underſtand that he " deſired to be excuſed." Of this conduct Lord Bolingbroke expreſſed, in high terms, the royal approbation.

Writing to the Earl of Orrery, Reſident at Bruſſels, nearly at this time, Lord Bolingbroke ſays, " I cannot foreſee, beſides the " clamor of Jacobitiſm and the danger of Popery—which, *except* " *a few old women*, nobody is in earneſt about—any theme for " Lord Nottingham's eloquence to diſplay itſelf upon." At the commencement of the enſuing year (1714), little more than ſix months previous to the Queen's demiſe, when the projects of the Court might be ſuppoſed in ſome forwardneſs, Mr. Prior, writing moſt confidentially to Lord Bolingbroke, does not give the moſt diſtant hint of theſe " treaſonous practiſes." On the contrary, he expreſſes the greateſt conſternation at the precarious ſtate of the Queen's health. " If that ſhould happen, which one hates " even to think of, what ſort or ſet of men," ſays he, " are to be " our taſk-maſters? What would become of us all?—The " thought, I grant you, is very mean—What would become " of *Me*? but humanity is frail and querulous." Lord Bolingbroke, writing at this period to the Earl of Angleſea, recommends, in the moſt energetic language, union amongſt the Tories; " he is ſure," as he affirms, " that the Whigs will " be

and inconſiſtency to contempt; but to ſcreen folly and vanity from contempt, can be a duty incumbent upon no one.

Mr.

" be united, and he ſhould be ſorry to ſee it, in any de-
" gree, made the intereſt of the Houſe of Hanover, to give
" in to that party whoſe tyranny the nation has ſo long felt."
February 1714 he declares his ſentiments to the Earl of Straf-
ford, Ambaſſador, who was ſubſequently impeached as an ac-
complice in the " treaſonous practiſes" of Oxford and Boling-
broke, in the following remarkable terms:—" For my part, I
" ſleep in perfect tranquillity; we are in the true intereſt of
" our country; we have no aims which we need be aſhamed to
" own. The great load we have lain under has been the pre-
" tended inſecurity of the ſucceſſion; this the Queen has taken
" an effectual method to remove. Mr. Harley, who will ſet out
" immediately, has orders, when he renews thoſe aſſurances
" which have been ſo frequently given by the Queen, of her
" firm reſolution to ſupport the ſucceſſion of the family of
" Hanover, to take notice to the Princeſs Sophia and the
" Elector, that theſe inclinations of the Queen continuing
" the ſame, the laws on which their right to the Crown
" is eſtabliſhed continuing the ſame, and the oaths of the
" people, in which we are all bound in the moſt ſolemn manner,
" continuing likewiſe the ſame, it will be very unjuſt, and
" very diſagreable to her Majeſty, if they themſelves, or any
" employed by them, ſhould give the leaſt encouragement
" or countenance to the clamors raiſed by a faction, who
" mean nothing leſs than the real advantage of that family,
" and whoſe only view is to regain the power which they
" abuſed, even at the expence of the public tranquillity. He
" is farther to repreſent, that the Queen determines to bring

Mr. Coxe, without the leaſt authority, and merely for the ſake of his hypotheſis, pretends " that Ruſſia and Sweden at this period cheriſhed " thoſe

" the queſtion, about the ſecurity of their ſucceſſion, to a " ſhort iſſue; and therefore has commanded him to aſk of " them, Whether they have any additional ſecurities to propoſe? " If they have none, he will ſay, that the Queen muſt un- " derſtand them to be ſatisfied with thoſe which now ſub- " ſiſt; if they have any, he has orders to aſſure them be- " forehand, that in caſe the propoſals they make are con- " ſiſtent with the Queen's honor, her ſafety, with the terms " of the laws by which the Crown is entailed, her Ma- " jeſty will not only conſent to, but promote all ſuch pro- " poſals." To the ſame nobleman Lord Bolingbroke writes, March 1714, " It is indeed, my Lord, ſurprizingly ſtrange, " that alliances with Denmark, Pruſſia, or any other foreign " Power, can be eſteemed at Hanover, as true expedients for " ſecuring the ſucceſſion to the Crown of Britain. Our laws, " our oaths, a juſt concern for our religion and liberty, will " keep the nation firm and ſteady in their adherence to a " proteſtant, and in their oppoſition to a popiſh Prince." How aſtoniſhing to Lord Bolingbroke would have been the modern diſcovery, " that the Court of Vienna knew the party which " ſupported the intereſts of the Electoral family in England to " be extremely weak!" Mr. Prior, April 1714, in alluſion to the famous debate on the motion of Lord Wharton, reſpecting the danger of the proteſtant ſucceſſion, ſays, in a *private diſpatch* to Lord Bolingbroke, " We are all in admir- " ation at what you have been doing in England; and I " pity thoſe whoſe buſineſs it is to keep others in their ſenſes. " The Pretender, *abandoned* by France, yet dreaded from

" Luneville

" thoſe hoſtile ſentiments againſt the King " of England, which afterwards produced ſuch " dangerous

" Luneville and Bar-le-duc, by thoſe men who made a jeſt " of King James attacking us, though *ſupported* by this " kingdom, and either at St. Germaines, or on the coaſt " of Normandy, ſeems a paradox, till one tells M. de Torcy, " that thoſe men were then in power, and are not ſo at " preſent." April 23, 1714, Lord Bolingbroke informs the Earl of Strafford, " that the Queen has forbid Mr. Schultz, " the Hanoverian Envoy, the Court, for demanding of the " Lord Chancellor the writ for the Duke of Cambridge, with- " out the decency of giving her Majeſty the leaſt intimation " of it. Indeed, my Lord, at this rate, the diſpute will not " be between the Houſe of Hanover and the Pretender any " more, the Queen will become a party; to come hither with " an air of defiance to the Queen, and on the foot of a party, is " ſurely the unwiſeſt and moſt unneceſſarily deſperate reſo- " lution that ever yet was taken. Lord Paget will be going " to Hanover very ſoon, to bring that Court, if poſſible, to " a. better notion of their own intereſt." In a ſubſequent letter, May 18, he ſays, " I am heartily glad to find there " are at preſent no farther thoughts entertained of ſending " the Duke of Cambridge over; and I am glad of it, be- " cauſe I wiſh well to the proteſtant ſucceſſion. The plain " intereſt of the Houſe of Hanover is to live well with the " Queen, and after her deceaſe to aſcend the Throne with " a national concurrence." In a diſpatch (dated May 20th) to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, Sir Conſtantine Phipps, a flaming high-church bigot, ſtrongly ſuſpected of Jacobitiſm, Lord Bolingbroke declares, " that he hoped the whole *church* " *intereſt* would, as one man, have laid hold of this favor-

"dangerous effects." But the deſigns of the King of England againſt Bremen, Verden, and Mecklenburg,

"able conjuncture to ſupport the Queen, *excluſive* of all other "aſſiſtance, to veſt ALL POWER in THEMSELVES, and by "theſe means to eſtabliſh themſelves for the preſent age, "and for FUTURITY. This," ſays he, "made no impreſſion, "and as long as the ſucceſſion remained in danger, nothing "elſe was, it ſeems, to be regarded. This danger of the ſuc-"ceſſion was the ſubject of many private debates, and very fa-"tally, in my opinion, to the church cauſe, of ſome public "debates. When it was aſked, What remedy, what farther ſe-"curity ſhould be provided? Thoſe who expreſſed their fears "had none to offer, but expected that they who ſaw no diſtemper "ſhould preſcribe a method of cure." In a farther diſpatch (dated July 28), immediately on the diſmiſſion of the Earl of Oxford, to the Lord Juſtices of Ireland, who were the Lord Chancellor and the Archbiſhops of Armagh and Tuam, Lord Bolingbroke expreſſes his hopes, that things will ſoon ſettle into order, and be conducted with vigor. He gives no intimation that the Queen's health was at this time particularly affected, and much leſs that her death was apprehended. But, conſcious that the fall of Oxford would add to the terrors, or at leaſt to the clamors of the oppoſite party, he adds, "One would imagine, that the vigilancy uſed in diſ-"covering, and the ſeverity uſed in proſecuting, ſuch as were "liſted, or as liſted others, for the Pretender, might be ſufficient "to calm the minds of men, by ſhowing them they are "ſafe, through the care and under the protection of the Go-"vernment." July 31, he writes again to their Lordſhips, to apprize them, in a few intereſting and important lines, of the then ſituation of affairs. "I have," ſays he, "juſt "time

Mecklenburg, if they ſo early exiſted, were as yet entirely *in embrio*; and had they been relinquiſhed at his acceſſion to the Britiſh Crown, Ruſſia and Sweden would doubtleſs, with the ardor of political rivalſhip, have been mutually eager to have ſecured his friendſhip. To Sweden, in its preſent lamentable ſtate of de-

"time to tell you, that the Queen draws apace to her latter "end. All poſſible care has been taken to put the king- "dom into a condition of paſſing quietly under that Govern- "ment which the law has eſtabliſhed." On the 3d of Auguſt 1714, he writes to congratulate the new Monarch on his auſpicious acceſſion to the Crown, amidſt the acclamations of his people. "*C'eſt ce même eſprit*, to tranſcribe his own memorable words, *qui agit généralement tout le monde; & les factions qui ont accutumées d'agiter ce gouvernement paroiſſent être ceſsés.* DIEU *veuille que la ſageſſe & la fermité de votre Majeſté les puiſſent empêcher de renaître.*"

If it were not rather too degrading to argue this point farther, and to argue it with ſuch a man as Mr. Coxe, it might be aſked to whom Lord Bolingbroke would venture to communicate thoſe "treaſonous practiſes" for which, as we are told, Memoirs, p. 199, "he was juſtly attainted," if not to ſuch men as the Lords Juſtices of Ireland? Alſo ſuppoſing, for the ſake of argument, in oppoſition to the cleareſt evidence, that Lord Bolingbroke *had* entertained deſigns of repealing the Act of Settlement, upon what unheard-of principle of law or the conſtitution could he have been attainted of high treaſon for moving, as Firſt Miniſter of the Crown, a repeal which it was undoubtedly competent to the moſt inſignificant Member of the Legiſlature to propoſe?

preſſion, the amity of Great Britain was of the utmoſt moment. And even Ruſſia, the triumphant Power, indicated an inceſſant and earneſt ſolicitude, notwithſtanding repeated provocations, to acquire the favorable regards of the King of England. Lord Stair, in a diſpatch to Secretary Craggs, June 1717, ſays, "The Czar courts the King's friendſhip, and "has ordered his troops to leave the Dutchy "of Mecklenburg inſtantly. He deſires to take "meaſures with the King, either for peace or "war with Sweden, and offers to make a treaty "of commerce to our ſatisfaction." On the demiſe of Louis XIV. the King of England ſtood on the ſame high ground with reſpect to Philip V. King of Spain, and the Regent Duke of Orleans, both eventual competitors for the Crown of France. In fine, Mr. Coxe tells us, and the obſervation is certainly true, if not perfectly novel, "that the Pope, at the æra of the Brunſ-"wick acceſſion, was no longer a great tem-"poral Prince, and took no active part in the "affairs of Europe." The circumſtance chiefly remarkable is, "that Innocent XIII. ſhould— "agreeably to the repreſentation of Mr. Coxe, "—as a mark of his attachment to the Pre-"tender, offer him an aſylum at Rome," ſeven years before his acceſſion to the papal throne, at this

this time occupied by Clement XI. of the Houſe of Albani, who kept poſſeſſion of that high dignity during a long and memorable pontificate of twenty-one years. But for the more ſatisfactory ſolution of this important previous queſtion, whether the political difficulties of the King of England were or were not of his own creation, it may not be amiſs to conclude the preſent review of the caſe, by referring to the ſtatement of facts which Mr. Coxe himſelf gives, p. 58-9, as the moſt direct confutation of his own aſſertions: page 51-2, "*that no prince ever* "*aſcended the throne with leſs appearance of a quiet* "*reign than George I. whether we conſider the* "*ſtate of the European powers, the ſituation of par-* "*ties in Great Britain, or his own character*;" and "*that the Emperor well knew the party in England* "*which favored the acceſſion of the Houſe of Brunſ-* "*wick to be* EXTREMELY WEAK." GEORGE I. "was proclaimed King, with the uſual ſo- "lemnities, in the cities of London and Weſt- "minſter; no diſorder was committed, or op- "poſition made. The proclamation took place "with equal tranquillity at Edinburgh and Dub- "lin." "Both Houſes agreed unanimouſly to "addreſſes of congratulation, and in aſſuring "the King of their firm reſolution to ſupport "his undoubted title to the Crown." "When

" the renewal of the Civil Liſt was brought in-
" to the Lower Houſe, the TORIES propoſed one
" million, which was 300,000l. more than the
" revenue of the late Queen. A bill paſſed,
" offering the ſum of 100,000l. to any perſon
" apprehending the Pretender, if he ſhould at-
" tempt to land in the Britiſh dominions. The
" Lord Chancellor intimated his Majeſty's great
" ſatisfaction at the loyalty and affection which
" his ſubjects had diſplayed. Other loyal ad-
" dreſſes were made in reply; and thus ended
" a Seſſion, which was conducted with a de-
" gree of tranquillity and unanimity long un-
" known to their proceedings, *and ſeemed to give a*
" *happy omen of a* QUIET *and* PROSPEROUS REIGN."
But more than ſufficient attention has already been paid to a writer, whoſe capacity and talents are manifeſtly and utterly unequal to the taſk of arranging and digeſting the ample materials which he himſelf has been the means of communicating to the Public.

No ſooner did the Hanoverian Monarch find himſelf firmly fixed upon his throne, than he began to conſider in what mode the power and riches of England might be made ſubſervient to his views of exaltation and aggrandiſement, as a Prince of the Empire. Bremen and Verden

den on one ſide, and Mecklenburg on the other, preſented objects irreſiſtibly tempting to the ambition of the Elector King; and within the lapſe of a very few months, his ſchemes began to unfold themſelves. In the ſummer of 1715, that fatal Treaty, *the ſource of all our woes*, was concluded with Denmark, by which the Dutchies of Bremen and Verden, unjuſtly wreſted by the Daniſh Monarch from the Crown of Sweden, were *flagrante bello* ceded to Hanover; and Hanover in return engaged to become a party in the war againſt Sweden, and to guarantee the poſſeſſion of Sleſwick—another of the recent uſurpations of Denmark—to the Daniſh Crown. A tranſaction more palpably injurious, more incapable of extenuation, more calculated to excite a lively and permanent reſentment in the breaſt of the injured party, hiſtory does not exhibit. Almoſt equal provocation was offered to Ruſſia, by oppoſing her views of gaining a ſettlement in the Empire, and with much greater reaſon, by offering to join with Sweden, in order to compel Ruſſia to reſtore her Swediſh conqueſts, as a compenſation for the ceſſion of Bremen and Verden. To the Emperor extreme offence was given, by the open and undiſguiſed indulgence of a ſpirit of lawleſs and boundleſs ambition; and he refuſed, with

with firmneſs and dignity, to countenance a ſyſtem of conduct ſo odious and unjuſtifiable. For the ſake of conciliating his favor, the Quadruple Alliance was formed, and the pride of Spain was mortally wounded, at the ſame time that her intereſts were injured in the tendereſt part, by the attack upon her fleet at Meſſina. In conſequence of this interpoſition, Spain was made a determined enemy, although the Emperor was not converted into a friend. The inveſtitures were ſtill refuſed, the attempts on Mecklenburg were ſtill repelled, and diſappointment and chagrin changing by degrees to alienation and reſentment; the Court of London at length totally abandoned the antient alliance with Auſtria, threw herſelf into the arms of France, and by the Treaty of Hanover, to adopt the words of Lord Chatham, "deſtroyed that building which we afterwards "in vain endeavored to raiſe again, and weakened the only power which it was our intereſt "to ſtrengthen." This is not an invidious or exaggerated ſtatement of facts, but corroborated by the moſt deciſive teſtimonies of the greateſt ſtateſmen whom this nation has produced. "That the Treaty of Hanover," ſays Lord Cheſterfield, "was calculated only to ſupport and "defend the new poſſeſſions and claims of the

"Electorate

" Electorate of Hanover, is beyond all contro-
" verſy; as likewiſe that the exorbitant power
" of the Houſe of Auſtria was no better than
" a political bugbear, to be found nowhere;—
" no, not in the brain of thoſe who endeavoured
" moſt to have it miſtaken for a reality. Were
" our fluctuating meaſures, our contradictory
" treaties, for and againſt Sweden, for and againſt
" Ruſſia, for and againſt the Houſe of Auſtria,
" unknown to any informed man in the king-
" dom, or the true motives of them ſecrets to
" any diſcerning one? Rather than ſuffer Bre-
" men and Verden to be forced out of the
" gripe of Hanover, all Europe was to be em-
" broiled or even ſacrificed, ſo important were
" theſe places become, and ſo ſacred their con-
" nexion with that upſtart Electorate*."

Fully to ſtate the ſentiments of the moſt enlightened and illuſtrious patriots of thoſe times, reſpecting the Hanoverian ſyſtem, would be to tranſcribe a large proportion of their ſpeeches, letters, and political publications. Upon this ſubject the *ſpecioſneſs of Cheſterfield* admirably accords with the *ſophiſtry of Bolingbroke*. " The
" intereſt of Britain at the era of the Hanoverian

* Vindication of the Caſe of the Hanoverian Forces.

" acceſſion,"

" acceſſion," ſays the latter of theſe celebrated noblemen, " required, no doubt, that we ſhould " turn our eyes from the continent to our own " iſland, and that we ſhould improve the op- " portunity and the advantages which a peace " gave us. Whatever prejudices have been pro- " pagated induſtriouſly againſt that of Utrecht, " thus much at leaſt is certain, we were obliged " no longer by treaties to aſſume any other part " in the affairs of the continent than that which " the immediate intereſt of our own country re- " quired. The opportunity and the means of " diminiſhing taxes, reviving commerce, and " paying debts, were open to us: this ſhould " have been the ſcheme of our policy, but un- " happily it was not. The late King, as Elector " of Hanover, had reaſon no doubt to deſire the " acquiſition of Bremen and Verden; our nation " contributed to it with her money, and forced " it with her arms, though it was made in con- " tradiction to the engagements that the Crown " of England had taken, when King William " gave his guarantee to the Treaty of Traven- " dahl. This acquiſition became the firſt link of " a political chain, by which we were dragged " back into new and expenſive broils, the con- " ſequences whereof we feel at this hour. As " long as there were hopes of obtaining an *ex-*

" *traordinary*

" *traordinary* inveſtiture of Bremen and Verden" (*i. e.* an inveſtiture which ſhould include the Imperial city of Bremen) " we flattered the Em-
" peror at no ſmall expence. As ſoon as it be-
" came apparent that this inveſtiture could be
" obtained in no other manner than it had been
" granted formerly, we inſulted him; we imput-
" ed to him deſigns he has conſtantly diſown-
" ed, and we have never proved: after which
" we complained of his ingratitude, we threat-
" ened war, and we prepared for it, by main-
" taining with great profuſion a ſtanding army
" of Heſſians in Germany. The ſame men who
" complained ſo lately that France had been
" left too powerful by the Treaty of Utrecht,
" and that great danger would ariſe from her
" cloſe connexion with Spain, complained now
" of the too great power of the Houſe of Auſtria,
" and of the danger that would ariſe from a
" good underſtanding between the Emperor and
" King Philip. In ſhort, our politics were not
" only variable, but incomprehenſible to every
" man who knew the ſtate and intereſt of Great
" Britain, but was not ſo well appriſed of the
" ſeveral turns of intereſt which were to be
" ſerved abroad*."

* Reflexions on the Preſent State of the Nation.

But

But it is remarkable that even Mr. Coxe's own immaculate Memoirs furniſh facts in abundance to anſwer all the purpoſes, and to juſtify all the concluſions, of theſe ſpecious and factious *ſophiſters*, and, indeed, to render meritorious the bittereſt reflexions that have ever yet been made on the ſpirit and tendency of the Hanoverian ſyſtem. "On the death of Charles XII." this writer (p. 161) informs us, "George, though "involved in diſputes with Spain, yet ſecure of "the co-operation of France, diſpatched Car-"teret and Baſſewitz to break up the Congreſs "of Aland, and to prevent the pacification be-"tween Ruſſia and Sweden, from a dread leaſt "their union ſhould render his mediation unne-"ceſſary, and induce Sweden to decline confirm-"ing the ceſſion of Bremen and Verden. Car-"teret ſucceeded in his negotiation, and is "applauded, though not without regret, by the "Swediſh hiſtorians, for the conſummate addreſs "with which he prevailed on Sweden to con-"clude a ſeparate peace with Hanover. Before "the pacification was finally concluded, Sweden "ſuffered ſeverely for breaking off the Congreſs "of Aland; the Danes took Marſtrand and "threatened Gotheburg; forty thouſand Ruſ-"ſians landed in different parts of Sweden, and "carried havock and deſtruction into the king-

"dom,

" dom, reduced eight towns and above 1300 " villages to aſhes. Carteret, ſupported by the " preſence of an Engliſh fleet in the Baltic, de- " luded Sweden with promiſes to aſſiſt in wreſt- " ing from Ruſſia the conquered provinces, and " prevailed on her to confirm the ceſſion of " Bremen and Verden." A more odious picture of Machiavelian policy is perhaps no where to be found. The Congreſs of Aland, by the inſidious artifices of the Court of London, was broken off, and a horrid and deſtructive war, which had already laſted eighteen years, was indefinitely prolonged, in order that the views of Hanover on Bremen and Verden might not be ultimately fruſtrated. Theſe are amongſt the innumerable facts connected with the Hanoverian ſyſtem, which have excited the utmoſt indignation of the advocates of rectitude, juſtice, and humanity: but a writer like Mr. C. who values himſelf upon his moderation and candor, can paſs over theſe *venial errors* without a ſingle harſh or uncourtly remark.

But the prevailing opinion of foreigners, whether friends or foes, relative to the policy of the Engliſh Court and its pernicious tendency, entirely correſponded with that of all intelligent perſons at home. Count Broglio, in his ſecret corref-

correſpondence with the King of France, declares the " King of Great Britain to be more engaged " with his German Miniſters in the affairs of " Hanover than of England;" " *Toute ſon ambition* " *étoit d'aggrandir ſes Etats d'Allemagne*," ſays M. Voltaire, Hiſtoire de Charles XII. M. Rouſſet, after having given an account of the Congreſs of Cambray, expreſſes himſelf, by way of introduction to the Treaties of 1721 and 1724 concluded between Sweden and Ruſſia, to the following effect: " While they ſeemed to labor in that " city (Cambray) for the pacification of the " ſouthern parts of Europe, quiet and tranquil- " lity ſucceeded to a long and cruel war in the " north; but, at the ſame time, certain intereſts " were made the baſis of many tranſactions which " bid fair to ſet all that part of Europe in a " flame. By this," as he informs us, " is to be " underſtood the ceſſion of the dutchies of Bre- " men and Verden to the Elector of Hanover, " and the invaſion of the dutchy of Sleſwick, a " hint of which is all that can be expected here, " becauſe it would require a volume to ſhew " the influence which theſe two tranſactions had " upon many ſubſequent events." So abſurd and unaccountable did the policy of the Engliſh Court appear to that of France reſpecting theſe affairs, that Lord Stair declares, in a diſpatch to

Secretary

Secretary Craggs, June 1719, " that the Cardinal " Dubois is firmly perſuaded the Engliſh Mini- " ſters know nothing of all the buſineſs of the " north, and that M. Bernſtorf keeps all thoſe " matters entirely to himſelf." Even Lord Townſhend, in a letter to Secretary Stanhope, dated October 1716, did not heſitate to ſay, " I per- " fectly agree with you, that England as well as " the reſt of Europe ever had, and always muſt " have, a great intereſt in the preſervation of the " balance of the North, and yet I cannot help " being of opinion, that if the Northern affairs " were brought into Parliament by his Majeſty's " order, upon the foot they now ſtand, his Ma- " jeſty would be ſo far from obtaining any aſſiſt- " ance on that head, that there would be great " danger from ſuch a ſtep of ruining his credit " and influence in both Houſes. The argu- " ments for maintaining a balance in the North " will be turned againſt all that has been doing " ever ſince the ſiege of Stralſund; and they " will tell us, I fear, that had the intended " deſcent ſucceeded, in the way and with the " troops deſigned for that expedition, the balance " of the North had been effectually ruined, and " the Czar made maſter of all the trade of the " Baltic." Unfortunately, when reinſtated in power, this nobleman ſeemed altogether to have

diſcarded his former notions, and the complaiſance of Parliament being now ſufficiently tried and manifeſted, he appeared diſpoſed to go the ſame dangerous and unwarrantable lengths in ſupport of the Hanoverian ſyſtem as his predeceſſors Stanhope and Sunderland. So ſtrongly, nevertheleſs, were the minds of all true Patriots impreſſed with the miſchiefs of this deteſted ſyſtem, that when Sir Robert Walpole, at a ſubſequent period, and in the decline of his power, imparted to the Speaker Onſlow a deſign then in contemplation, of a royal meſſage to the Houſe of Commons, propoſing to declare, by Act of Parliament, after the death of the reigning King, the ſame perſon incapable of inheriting the Crown of Great Britain with the Electorate of Hanover; and queſtioned him in theſe terms, "What will you ſay, Speaker, if this hand of "mine ſhall bring ſuch a meſſage from the "King?" Mr. Onſlow anſwered, "Sir, it will "be as a meſſage from Heaven*." In truth no man ſaw more clearly, and, ſo far as his influence went, oppoſed more ſteadily, the ſyſtem in queſtion than Sir Robert Walpole, of whom it is now not adulation to ſay, that a Miniſter of juſter views and more enlightened wiſdom never ſway-

* Coxe's Memoirs.

ed

ed the councils of any kingdom; he did all that any man in his ſituation could have done for the advantage of the nation; he governed the State for more than twenty years, not ſo well certainly as he was ſolicitous to have done, but as well as the Sovereign, the Parliament, and the People themſelves would permit him to govern it. He invariably declared that foreign affairs did not appertain to his department; he even frequently affected to ſay, that he had not ſtudied, and did not profeſs to underſtand them, but that when he was called upon as a member of the Council to give his opinion, he adviſed thoſe meaſures which he thought moſt conducive to the ſecurity, peace, and proſperity of the country. It would be the higheſt injuſtice to his memory not to acknowledge, that there exiſts the moſt indubitable evidence of the veracity of this general aſſertion, and it is ſtrikingly confirmed and corroborated by the Papers recently publiſhed by Mr. Coxe. From theſe Papers, as well as from innumerable pre-exiſting documents, it clearly appears that Sir Robert Walpole never profeſſed an unreſerved and unqualified approbation of the Treaty of Hanover. Adverting, in his celebrated ſpeech on the motion of Mr. Sandys for removing him from the preſence and councils of the King, to that memorable Treaty, which has

always been regarded as the *criſis of projection*, with reſpect to the Anglo-Germanic ſyſtem, he thus expreſſed himſelf, " As to foreign affairs, I muſt " take notice of the uncandid manner in which " the gentlemen on the other ſide have managed " the queſtion, by blending numerous treaties " and complicated negotiations into one general " maſs. To form a fair and candid judgment " of the ſubject, it becomes neceſſary not to " conſider the Treaties merely inſulated, but to " advert to the time in which they were made, " to the circumſtances and ſituation of Europe " when they were made, to the peculiar ſitua- " tion in which I ſtand, and to the *power* which " I poſſeſſed." The Quadruple Alliance, univerſally reprobated as one of the moſt exceptionable of thoſe treaties, he declared himſelf to be in no degree reſponſible for, either in reſpect to its articles or its effects, not being then a member of the Adminiſtration. That this treaty originated in the Hanoverian Cabinet he knew too well, to be either willing or able to deny. So early as Nov. 1716, Secretary Stanhope, ſpeaking of the ſituation of Victor Amadæus of Savoy, in a diſpatch to Lord Townſhend from Hanover, uſed theſe words, " He will think himſelf very " happy if the King can ſecure his peace with " the Emperor at the expence of Sicily, *ſo that*

" *we*

" *we may boldly offer Sicily to the Emperor, and* " *may, I hope, ſecure his aſſiſtance for theſe* NOR- " THERN AFFAIRS." ON his return to power he found the nation committed, and the honor of Government pledged, by the terms of this treaty: Paſſing on to the Treaty of Hanover, he proteſted to the Houſe, " that if he were " at liberty to give the true hiſtory of that treaty, " he could fully juſtify his own conduct. He " then obſerved, that his late Majeſty had ſuch " information as convinced not only him, but " thoſe of his Council both at home and abroad, " that dangerous deſigns had been formed be- " tween the Emperor and Spain, at the time " of their concluding the Treaty of Vienna, " 1725; deſigns dangerous to the liberties, not " merely of England, but of Europe. The ob- " ject of them was not merely to wreſt Gibraltar " and Port Mahon from this nation, and force " the Pretender upon us, but to marry the eldeſt " Archdutcheſs to the infant Don Carlos, who " might, and probably would, thereby eventually " unite, in his own perſon, the Crown of Spain " with the Imperial dignity. It was therefore " highly reaſonable, both in France and Eng- " land, to take the alarm at ſuch deſigns, and " prevent the execution of them; for this pur- " poſe an alliance was neceſſary, and that we

" might not truſt too much to the aſſiſtance of " France, it became requiſite to form alliances " alſo with the Northern Powers, and ſome of " the Princes of Germany." Here the queſtion is placed upon the proper foundation; he virtually admits, that by an indefenſible policy, for which he was in no wiſe accountable, we had made thoſe great powers of Europe our enemies whoſe friendſhip we ought moſt to have cultivated, and were thereby compelled to embrace the alliance of France to ward off the immediate impending danger, however the balance of Europe might be, and really was, in conſequence, endangered by it. Being precluded, from the nature of his ſituation, from entering into the particulars of the negotiation, he could not, as he intimates, offer a complete vindication of his conduct in this inſtance: it is for poſterity, therefore, to do that juſtice to his memory, which he could not render to himſelf. SO far back as the ſummer of 1723, we find Sir Robert Walpole extremely anxious to obviate the effects of Lord Townſhend's intrigues in the north, and to put ſome limit to the extravagance of the ſecret expences. " The 150,000l." ſays he, July 23, in a letter to Lord Townſhend, " may certainly be had; at the ſame time, I " cannot but wiſh from my heart that this mo-

" ney

" ney may not be demanded. If we enter pre-
" cipitately into any engagement upon this oc-
" caſion," *i. e.* the acceſſion of the King of Swe-
den (Frederic of Heſſe-Caſſel), " we ſhall not
" carry the nation, nor perhaps the Parliament,
" along with us; in a word, my politics are to
" keep free from all engagements as long as we
" poſſibly can. You'll forgive my ſudden and
" poſſibly very improper thoughts upon a ſubject
" that I am but little acquainted with, but I am
" *mightily inclined to be cautious.* France has, I ap-
" prehend, been a long time in negotiation with
" the Czar—What part will France act upon
" this occaſion? In ſhort, I wiſh to God we may,
" at leaſt for a little time, remain neuters and
" look on, if all the reſt of Europe does the ſame
" thing." In July 1725, during the interval be-
tween the ſigning of the Vienna and Hanover
Treaties, Lord Townſhend being then at Hano-
ver with the King, we find great coldneſs prevail-
ing between that nobleman and Sir Robert Wal-
pole, and a great difference of opinion ſubſiſt-
ing relative to foreign politics. Sir Robert
Walpole remonſtrates againſt Mr. Poyntz's draw-
ing, by order of Lord Townſhend, for ſo large a
ſum as 100,000l. for ſecret ſervice, and informs
him, " that it muſt either be provided for out
" of the *Civil Liſt*, or, if paid out of funds already

" appropriated to other purpoſes, it muſt give " publicity to thoſe apprehenſions which it is " thought adviſable ſhould be kept private." Lord Townſhend in reply talks of the danger from the Czarina, upon which ſubject he reminds Sir Robert Walpole, " that he had the *happineſs* " of reaſoning ſome hours with him at his own " houſe, before he left England;" and he is zealous enough to aſſert " that M. Poyntz was, in " his opinion, only too frugal."

In September, ſoon after the ſigning of the Treaty of Hanover, the Duke of Newcaſtle, Secretary of State, informs Lord Townſhend, by whoſe influence he was advanced to that poſt, " that he had laid before the Lords of the Regen- " cy, having Lord Townſhend's letters before " him to juſtify his accounts, a particular rela- " tion of our preſent ſituation, with reſpect to " the Courts of Vienna and Madrid; and had " endeavored to ſhow how *unprovoked* the be- " havior of the latter was to his Majeſty, and " *how* it was entirely owing to the dictates and " ſuggeſtions of the Court of Vienna, whoſe re- " ſentment the King had drawn upon himſelf, " *upon no other account* than his endeavors to " procure for the Court of Spain the advantages " they were juſtly entitled to by their Treaties.

" He

" He alſo explained to their Lordſhips the in-
" ducements of the Court of Spain, which was
" ſolely under the direction of the Queen, to act
" this *extravagant and unjuſt part* towards his Ma-
" jeſty, which *could* be only the marriage of her
" Catholic Majeſty's ſon with one, if not the
" eldeſt, of the Archdutcheſſes." Upon the whole, it appears from this tedious and abſurd letter, that the articles of the Treaty of Hanover were either approved of, or ſilently acquieſced in, by all the Lords of the Regency, of whom Sir Robert Walpole was one, though certainly not upon the preciſe grounds and for the preciſe reaſons ſtated by his Grace. Lord Townſhend, in reply to the Duke, dwells largely on the danger to be apprehended from Ruſſia, and of the preparations making at Peterſburg for an invaſion of Great Britain; and he ſays " there can
" be no doubt but Spain is deeply engaged in
" this ſcheme: the impoſſibility that any power,
" except Spain, ſhould furniſh the money requir-
" ed, and the whole conduct of the King and
" Queen of Spain, leave no room to doubt, that
" they intend, in conjunction with the Czarina,
" to make an attempt upon us next ſpring. As
" to the Court of Vienna, we may certainly con-
" clude they have their ſhare in this project, ſince
" Spain is ſo evidently engaged in it, the Queen
" having

" having done nothing ſome time, but by their " directions." " I have been," he adds, " for " ſome months thoroughly perſuaded, that Spain " and the Court of Vienna, when they concluded " the late Treaty, entered into a ſtrong engage- " ment in favor of the Pretender by a ſecret ar- " ticle. I acquainted your Grace ſome time " ago with this intelligence, which I had from " ſo good hands, that I no more doubt the truth " of it than if I had actually ſeen the article." From the next diſpatch of Sir Robert Walpole (October 2, 1725) to Lord Townſhend it may be gathered, that though he would not take upon himſelf the reſponſibility of oppoſing the pre- ſent meaſures of ſecurity, he is far from being convinced of the reality of the danger. " Should " ſhips from Ruſſia," ſays he, " trading to Spain, " be intercepted, without farther evidence or ſa- " tisfaction to the world, it would be ſuch an " act of hoſtility as would make us deemed the " aggreſſors in caſe of a rupture. If we are to " be engaged in a war which I moſt heartily de- " precate, 'tis to be wiſhed that this nation may " think an invaſion by a foreign power, or an " evident deſign of ſuch an invaſion, the ſupport " of the Pretender, and the cauſe of the Proteſt- " ant ſucceſſion, are the chief and principal mo- " tives that obliged us to part with that peace

" and

" and tranquillity, and the happy conſequences " thereof which we now enjoy." Lord Townſhend having tranſmitted to London the ſketch of a warlike ſpeech, with which it was judged proper at Hanover to open the Seſſion, Sir Robert Walpole engages (Nov. 1725) to give " his " thoughts upon it on his Lordſhip's arrival; " but," ſays he, " it is neceſſary that I ſhould " ſuggeſt to your Lordſhip, that if the Parliament is to be opened in that manner, and " the meaſures are to be put in execution which " ſeem reſolved by the tenor of your Lordſhip's " ſeveral diſpatches, it will be adviſable that the " Parliament ſhould ſit about the middle of January. The Pulteneys build great hopes " upon the difficulties they promiſe themſelves " will ariſe from the foreign affairs, and eſpecially from the Hanover treaty. The laſt foreign " mail brought a letter from Count Staremberg " to William Pulteney, giving him great expectations of the materials he ſhould furniſh " him with."

Lord Townſhend, apparently chagrined at the continued and ſyſtematic oppoſition of Walpole, declares, in his anſwer, Dec. 1725, " that no- " thing can prevent a war in the preſent ſtate of " things, but vigorous reſolutions on the part of " Parliament,

" Parliament, which cannot be unleſs occaſion " is given from what the King ſhall ſay to them " from the throne. The Emperor's views, at this " juncture, are as extenſive and as dangerous to " Europe in general, and to our country in par- " ticular, as ever thoſe of Louis XIV. were; and " if we do not in time ſhew the world that we " are determined to oppoſe him, we ſhall be " involved in difficulties, and left alone with " France, &c. whereas ſhewing a ſpirit now will " ſecure us friends." Lord Townſhend was a man of honor and probity, and in the preſent heated ſtate of his mind, he probably thought nearly as he ſpoke; but the falſehood and adulation of Sunderland himſelf could not, when employed in ſupplanting this Miniſter, have exceeded this ſtretch of abſurdity. It had been the object of the two laſt general wars, to reſtore the balance of Europe, by elevating the Houſe of Auſtria to its juſt level with the Houſe of Bourbon. This great end was now in ſome meaſure attained by the annexation of the two Sicilies, Milan, and the Low Countries, to the hereditary dominions of the Emperor. And in this ſtate of things, the power of the Houſe of Bourbon being ſtill confeſſedly ſuperior, Lord Townſhend ſought to unite with France, in order to depreſs that very power which we had ſo recently

recently ſhed oceans of blood and expended millions upon millions of treaſure to ſtrengthen and exalt. Fortunately, the calm wiſdom of Walpole prevailed over the raſhneſs and violence of Townſhend, and the danger was ultimately and happily avoided. Count Palm, the Imperial Ambaſſador, writes to the Emperor, April 1726, "Count Bothmar, who continues ſtill to be for "a good underſtanding between the King and "your Imperial Majeſty, laments the violent pro-"ceedings. The King himſelf does, in my hum-"ble opinion, not much like the conduct of his "Engliſh Miniſtry." This is explained by a letter, dated May 16th 1726, from M. Pozobueno, the Spaniſh Ambaſſador, to the Duc de Ripperda. "The King of Great Britain," ſays he, "ſuſpects, more and more, that if the King of "Pruſſia conceives that the Treaty concluded at "Vienna, between the Emperor, Ruſſia, and "Sweden, will be prejudicial to his intereſts, he "will recede from the Treaty of Hanover; and "on this event the King's German dominions "will be expoſed to invaſion, ſhould a war be "occaſioned by the Treaty of Vienna. This "reflexion has conſiderably agitated the King's "mind, for it is evident that his wiſhes tend to "the preſervation and augmentation of his Elec-"torate; and his inclination is ſo great, that

"he

" he cannot diſſemble it. Beſides theſe ſubjects " of diſquiet, the King of England feels no leſs " chagrin in having loſt the confidence of the " Emperor. The King is no leſs troubled with " the ſuſpicions which he entertains, that the " Emperor is reſolving to annul the Treaty of " Hanover, as oppoſite to the conſtitution of the " Germanic empire. The Hanoverian party here " encourage theſe ſuſpicions, and inſinuate, that " an Electoral Aſſembly will be convened, for " the purpoſe of declaring the Treaty unconſti- " tutional, and of exhorting the King and Fre- " deric William, as Electors of Hanover and " Brandenburg, to retract it; and in caſe of refuſ- " al, to put them under the *ban* of the Empire." From a ſubſequent letter of M. Pozobueno to the Duc de Ripperda (May 23, 1726), we find, that the Dutcheſs of Kendal, with whom the Empreſs had deigned to correſpond on this ſubject, was deſirous of peace, " from an apprehen- " ſion of being expoſed to certain misfortunes " which threaten her. Her principal care is to " prevent thoſe misfortunes from happening un- " expectedly. To obtain that end, ſhe would " uſe all her efforts; for if a rupture with the " Emperor ſhould take place ſhe would be pre- " cluded from carrying her deſigns into execu- " tion, which are to retire into Germany, and

" convey

" convey away the large ſums of money which " ſhe poſſeſſes in England. Fabrice concluded " that the motive which induces the Dutcheſs " of Kendal to lean to the opinion of Walpole " to avoid a war is not as ſhe declares, becauſe it " is the intereſt of England, but from ſelf-intereſt. " The miſunderſtanding between Townſhend and " Walpole daily increaſes."

May 30, 1726, M. Pozobueno deſcribes to the Duc de Ripperda the diviſion ſubſiſting between Townſhend and Walpole as very great. " Whatever care," he ſays, " Miniſters may take " to conceal every unpleaſant fact, and to keep " a guarded ſilence, yet the nation is appriſed, " that whatever hoſtilities ariſe in the north they " will pay dearly for them. They obſerve that " moſt of the facts diſcloſed to them reſpecting " our treaties with Vienna are not truly ſtated."

Count Palm, in a ſecond letter to the Emperor, Dec. 1726, declares, that two-thirds of the Eng- " liſh nation not only abhor the war with his " Imperial Majeſty and Spain, but alſo the ſtrict " alliance and union with France. That theſe " precipitate and dangerous meaſures can be " imputed to none elſe but the Engliſh Miniſtry: " that is to ſay, my Lord Townſhend, who has

" the

" the entire direction of foreign affairs, which," " he ſays, " Walpole does not meddle with; and " as to the Duke of Newcaſtle, it is known to " every body that he is nothing but a figure of " a Secretary of State." He adds, " that the " Oſtend commerce is a grievance induſtriouſly " enhanced by the Miniſtry to animate the " nation; and the majority of Parliament are " *bought over* with great penſions and employ- " ments." The Count deſcribes the King, as himſelf, of a peaceable nature, and deceived by the miſrepreſentations and falſe ſuggeſtions of Lord Townſhend, whoſe preſumption and violence ſeem indeed to have carried him to far greater lengths than the caution and natural good ſenſe and temper of the King could approve. And the Ambaſſador ſays, that " the " King liſtened with attention to the diſcourſes " of M. Fabrice, Gentleman of his Bed-chamber, " who frequently took an opportunity to ſpeak " of the conduct of his Engliſh Miniſters."

In a very remarkable letter from the Imperial Miniſter Count Zinzendorf to Count Palm, Dec. 21, 1726, that nobleman ſays, " The Engliſh " Miniſtry cannot ſupport themſelves otherwiſe " than by troubling and confounding matters. " We muſt wait to ſee whether the nation will " ſuffer

" ſuffer themſelves to be led away blindly any
" longer. Do they ſay that there is a ſecret
" engagement entered into in the offenſive alli-
" ance reſpecting Gibraltar? That is the greateſt
" untruth, as the Treaty itſelf ſhews. Do they
" ſay that an agreement is made concerning the
" Pretender? That is likewiſe the greateſt un-
" truth that can be imagined. Let them aſk
" all the Jacobites whether they have heard
" one word from us or from Spain that could be
" conſtrued to mean ſuch an enterpriſe, ſo long
" as we do not enter into a war: but then we
" ſhall help ourſelves as well as we can. As to
" the commerce of Oſtend, we have already made
" ſuch ſteps as ſhew the peaceable deſires of his
" Imperial Majeſty, *and we are ready every moment*
" *to go farther.* Do they talk of a marriage be-
" tween an Archdutcheſs and Don Carlos? It
" is very wonderful that they would prevent by
" a war *now* a caſe that is ſo far from happen-
" ing; which would not be avoided by a war
" were it intended; which is a caſe put, but
" not granted. What danger can Europe un-
" dergo by that? This only; that Don Carlos
" being a Prince of the houſe of Bourbon, the
" ſtrict union between France and Spain and
" this houſe will be promoted. But if France
" itſelf, as it ſeems, oppoſes this, and don't care

" that a cadet of that family ſhould riſe ſo high, " then this fixes a diſunion between France and " Spain, which was attempted to be fixed by ſo " long and bloody a war,"—alluding doubtleſs, to the war of the ſucceſſion. This letter reſolves the famous political problem, whether the Court of Vienna had really at this period entered into ſerious engagements with Spain for the reſtoration of the Pretender. It always appeared highly improbable to all reflecting and impartial perſons, that this *ſhould* be the fact, notwithſtanding the poſitive aſſertion of the King of England in his ſpeech from the throne; and it is now manifeſt, to an hiſtorical demonſtration, that the intelligence upon which the Court of London relied in this inſtance was wholly erroneous, from whatever quarter, or with whatever view or intention, it might have been communicated. Yet Mr. Coxe tells us (MEMOIRS of Walpole, vol. 1. p. 251), with this letter of M. Zinzendorf lying open before him, " that the " papers and documents ſubmitted to his inſpec- " tion, fully diſplay the proofs on which the " reality of the ſecret articles of the Treaty of " Vienna was formed; and which produced the " public declaration of the King, that the Em- " peror and King of Spain propoſed the reſtora- " tion of the Pretender." If this cloudy jargon

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be intended to convey a belief of the reality of this deſign, let him produce thoſe papers and documents which he pretends have been ſubmitted to his inſpection, and which ſhall outweigh and ſuperſede the poſitive confidential declaration of the Imperial Prime Miniſter to the Imperial Ambaſſador actually reſident at the Court of London. They are probably to be found in the ſame repoſitory with thoſe "incon-"trovertible papers and documents" which diſcover the ſchemes of Harley and Bolingbroke for the repeal of the Act of Settlement, and thoſe other papers, by which it appears "that Sir "Robert Walpole approved, in the ſtrongeſt "manner, of the acquiſition of Bremen and "Verden." Memoirs, p. 87.

Laſtly, M. Riva, reſident of the Duke of Modena in London, writing to his ſovereign, Dec. 1726, ſays, "Fabrice, a Hanoverian gentleman, "and in high favor with the King, has told me "in confidence that he has had the courage to "tell his Majeſty, that the animoſity of the "Engliſh Miniſters engages him in affairs which "may prove the ruin of his ſtates in Germany. "And that if a war ſhould be made, France "might, with the money of England, conquer "the Low Countries, in which caſe there will

" be a neceſſity to make a new war in conjunc-
" tion with old friends to take out of the hands
" of the French the ſaid Low Countries; and
" that France does not for the ſake of England
" and Holland ſhow ſo much eagerneſs for a
" war, but for her own. Fabrice has told me,
" that he ſpoke in this bold manner to the
" King, and that his Majeſty gave great atten-
" tion to it, ordering him to ſpeak freely to him
" of affairs, as he had already begun. I culti-
" vate the friendſhip of this perſon, becauſe I
" can by that means, *brevi manu.* learn many
" things that come from the fountain-head."

Upon a general review of the evidence here adduced, and were it neceſſary, *volumes*, to adopt the expreſſion of M. Rouſſet, might be added, is it poſſible ſeriouſly to maintain, " that the " treaty of Hanover originated," as Mr. Coxe pretends, " in an excluſive regard for the in-" tereſts of Great Britain." By a ſeries of unjuſt and impolitic meaſures, the reſult of a determination at all events to retain poſſeſſion of the Provinces of Bremen and Verden, the three great Powers of Auſtria, Ruſſia, and Spain were made the inveterate enemies of Britain. In order to reſiſt the deſigns of ſo potent a confederacy, the Court of London was reduced

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to the neceſſity of forming an anti-coalition, and of throwing itſelf, with its whole immenſe weight, into the ſcale of France, in oppoſition to the Houſe of Auſtria, its natural ally. But if the intereſts of Great Britain, and not the aggrandizement of the Electorate of Hanover, had been the real object of the King of England, he would undoubtedly have reſtored Bremen and Verden to Sweden; he would have withdrawn his guarantee of Sleſwick from Denmark, he would have relinquiſhed his claims upon Mecklenburg, and have acceded to the edict of the Pragmatic Sanction. The confederacy of Vienna would by this means have been at once diſſolved; the enmity of the Emperor would have been converted into friendſhip and gratitude; the Oſtend Company would have been annihilated, and all things would have reverted to their natural and antient ſtate. In lieu of which obvious and rational policy, the King of England, reſolute to retain his uſurpations and to enforce his claims, ſtrengthened himſelf on all ſides in order to reſiſt the combination of Vienna; and incurred the imminent riſque of involving Europe in a new and more deſtructive war than that recently terminated by the Treaty of Utrecht, rather than abandon his favorite project of engroſſing the entire domi-

nion of the Circle of Lower Saxony. Fortunately, the pacific counſels of Walpole, aſſiſted and confirmed by various ſecret co-adjutors, were not unavailingly employed in counteracting, and ultimately gained, a complete aſcendency over the wild and extravagant projects of Townſhend. On the moſt accurate and ſevere inveſtigation of this part of his public conduct, Sir Robert Walpole ſtands not only clear of reproach, but he is entitled to the higheſt approbation and applauſe. For more than twenty years he was the grand pacificator of Europe, in a great variety of difficult and critical ſituations, deporting himſelf with uniform mildneſs and moderation; diſplaying at once an extraordinary knowledge of mankind, a generous and enlarged ſpirit of benevolence, and the moſt profound and unerring political ſagacity.

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Having thus repelled the various charges brought againſt the Hiſtory of the Houſe of Brunſwick by Mr. Coxe, and corroborated by numerous additional teſtimonies the authenticity and authority of the narrative, it affords a real ſatisfaction to the writer to remark, that the cenſures and reflections thus extorted from him, affect

affect the character of Mr. Coxe only in the capacity of Author and Critic. For the arduous province of General Hiſtory he is manifeſtly unfit, being deficient no leſs in knowledge than in energy and comprehenſion of mind. But in thoſe departments of Literature to which his talents are better adapted, his publications are juſtly eſteemed: and his conduct in private life is ſuch as is ſaid to do honour to himſelf and his profeſſion. Weak and ill-founded as his remarks muſt upon enquiry appear to his readers, and even poſſibly to himſelf, ſhould they prove the means of recommending him to the notice of thoſe whom it is moſt his *intereſt* to pleaſe, it will afford not pain but pleaſure to the writer whom he has ſo ignorantly and injuriouſly traduced, but who now freely and frankly pardons the wrong he has received. Even the *Hero* of Mr. Coxe's publication, could he judge in the preſent controverſy, might perhaps deem himſelf as much honored by the jealous, though not ſcanty or reluctant, applauſe of the Hiſtorian, as by the laviſh and indiſcriminate panegyric of the Biographer. Sir Robert Walpole would doubtleſs have ſmiled to hear the Treaty of Hanover extolled as a meaſure in which the intereſts of the Electorate were wholly ſacrificed to thoſe of Great Bri-

tain. It is moreover a great miſtake to ſuppoſe, that whenever the acts of the adminiſtration of Sir Robert Walpole are cenſured, the cenſure extends, or was meant to extend, to the individual who occupied the principal poſt in the adminiſtration: the contrary is expreſsly affirmed; and the papers publiſhed by Mr. Coxe afford the cleareſt demonſtration, that the wiſdom of the Miniſter was invariably employed in counteracting the ill effects of thoſe meaſures, in which he was but too often compelled to acquieſce. Would to God that the ſame ſpirit of moderation, ſagacity, and conciliation, were to be found in the Miniſters of the preſent day!

In no age or country perhaps, was any man placed in a ſituation of more importance, or weightier reſponſibility, than Mr. Pitt. In no inſtance were the hopes and expectations of the genuine and rational friends of liberty more highly raiſed; in no inſtance were they ever more fatally diſappointed. The ſeries of cauſes leading to this cataſtrophe muſt be the theme of future Hiſtory. In treating of theſe cauſes and of their effects, ſo far as he has hitherto proceeded, the Author of the Hiſtory "of the Houſe of Brunſwick" has given his opinion freely

freely and openly. The ſtrength of his conviction on this intereſting ſubject muſt be his apology for the ſtrong language he has occaſionally adopted; and which in ſome, he flatters himſelf not many, inſtances may poſſibly be thought to have exceeded the indefinite and almoſt indiſcernible limits of an exact and ſcrupulous decorum. But the author of the Hiſtory in queſtion has been very cautious in imputing criminal motives to any man; and more eſpecially in charging any perſon with the far greater culpability of acting deliberately and intentionally upon them. The probability certainly in the eſtimate of candor is, that Mr. Pitt has been able to perſuade himſelf that his conduct hath, upon the whole, been wiſe and juſt. It is at leaſt impoſſible to deny that he has ſucceeded in infuſing this belief—MONSTROUS as it appears to others—into the minds of very many perſons, both in and out of Parliament, of the higheſt reſpectability and integrity: and he himſelf may, without doubt, have been, in a great degree, the dupe of his own faſcinating eloquence. "A fairer ſpirit loſt not heaven."

But the conſideration which can alone intereſt the public at large, is that which relates to the conſequences of the meaſures actually adopted from

from whatever motives; and thoſe who regard them as in the higheſt degree pernicious, and fraught with ſtill farther and mightier miſchiefs, muſt, and ought, to ſay and do all in their power to unmaſk a policy ſo deceitful and dangerous, and to exhibit ſuch a ſyſtem in its proper and genuine colours. As it is morally certain, agreeably to the fixed principles of human nature, that Mr. Pitt having long ſince completely committed himſelf, can no more revert to the principles with which he ſet out in life, the probability is, that he will be impelled, by motives in his ſituation irreſiſtible, to deviate farther and farther from them, till at length he will exhibit ſuch a character to the world, as at the commencement of his political career, he himſelf would have ſhuddered to contemplate. NAY, this is, perhaps, ALREADY the CASE.

An hundred years ago, the famous Dr. D'Avenant, in a tract ſtyled, "On Private Men's Duty in the Adminiſtration of Public Affairs," drew the hypothetical portrait of a Miniſter and miniſtry, under whoſe adminiſtration he ſuppoſed the liberty and property of this country would be expoſed to the moſt imminent danger. It may not be amiſs, as the opportunity fairly offers itſelf, to make ſome conſiderable extracts

extracts from this now almoſt forgotten but invaluable publication; and though it may be hoped that the political character of Mr. Pitt is as yet far from correſponding, in all points, to the picture thus delineated, it behoves him to conſider well, whether there does not exiſt ſo ſtrong and ſtriking a reſemblance, as may well cauſe his cheeks to glow, and his ears to tingle. But be it remembered, that Dr. d'Avenant cannot be ſuſpected, though writing with an almoſt prophetic ſpirit, of aiming any perſonal reflexions againſt the Miniſters of the preſent day, or of harboring any particular prejudice againſt the names of Pitt or of Grenville.

Every thing, indeed, it muſt be acknowledged, concurs in making a far heavier reſponſibility to reſt upon the former than the latter of theſe perſonages. Beyond compariſon ſuperior in influence, in capacity, in expectation, and in promiſe, Mr. Pitt was, from his earlieſt youth, regarded by the friends of human kind with emotions of enthuſiaſm, as pledged and almoſt conſecrated to the cauſe of liberty. But time, from whoſe verdict there is no appeal, has not ratified theſe lofty hopes. In the ſtead of wiſdom, we ſee only its wretched mimic, cunning; inſtead of magnanimity, pride; inſtead of penetration,

tration, poſitivity; in the room of fortitude, obſtinacy; in the place of moderation, meanneſs. For a juſt and beneficial courſe of action, is ſubſtituted an empty and pompous parade of language. "The nation"—to adopt the expreſſion of a truly great ſtateſman, the Marquis of Lanſdowne—"has been ruined by fine ſpeeches." But *the times are out of joint*. That oratory only is ſucceſsful which addreſſes itſelf to the prejudices and paſſions of men; and even a Fox or a Thurlow, pleading in the cauſe of truth, can ſcarcely hope to command attention. Eloquence is, when miſapplied, the moſt fatal of the gifts of heaven. To Mr. Pitt it has been apparently imparted by Providence in its ireful mood; not as a bleſſing, but as a curſe—a curſe to himſelf and to his country. The ſyſtem of government adopted by this moſt dangerous, becauſe moſt ſpecious, of Miniſters, is not only, in a political view, fundamentally and eſſentially erroneous; but, entering into the inmoſt receſſes of private and domeſtic life, it diſſolves all the ties, and is calculated to extinguiſh all the comforts of ſocial intercourſe. Diſlike of this ſyſtem, in *his* eſtimate of things, is diſaffection to Government; and the moſt caſual indiſcretions of men, highly virtuous in intention, are puniſhed as crimes of the deepeſt dye. Foreſeeing nothing,

nothing, and prepared for nothing, elated or depreſſed as fortune ſmiles or frowns, he exhibits alternately the extremes of preſumption and puſillanimity. Equally ignorant how to make war or peace*, unſkilled in the ſcience of human nature, diſdaining to conciliate the affections, he knows no mode of overcoming oppoſition but by coercion and violence, and is aſtoniſhed that he cannot by force ſubdue the unconquerable mind. When firſt placed at the head of affairs, "the people," to borrow the expreſſion of a great political writer, "were wrought "up to a temper, which ſeldom happens in a "whole nation, of being capable to receive good "and honeſt counſel." But what good, what honeſt counſel has the nation received from him? The fact notoriouſly is, that the movements of the public mind, under his guidance, have been uniformly retrograde; and, during his moſt inauſpicious adminiſtration, thoſe deteſtable diſtinctions and malignant prejudices have been revived, which it was the glory of the philoſophers and patriots of former times to uſe every effort to extinguiſh. No Miniſter ever perhaps had it in his power to effect ſo much good,

* "—*Neque de pace cum fide Phillippum agere, neque bella vera virtute unquam geſſiſſe. In colloquiis inſidiari et captare.*" Liv. lib. xxxii. § 33.

and

and no one certainly has ever been the cauſe of ſo much evil. Still he is ſuffered, through ſome unaccountable infatuation or ſupineneſs, to continue at that helm which it is manifeſt to the common ſenſe of mankind, he knows not how to guide. The mind ſickens at the idea that he is ſtill ſuffered to purſue, with headlong ſtaggering ſteps, that precipitous path which leads, with fatal certainty, to the gulph of political perdition. If Mr. Pitt has any feelings of compaſſion for this his native country, which bleeds and agonizes at every pore for the too partial indulgence ſhe has ſhown to him, let him exhibit one ſolitary inſtance of candor in the courſe of his public career, by an ingenuous acknowledgment of his utter incapacity to preſide over the affairs of a great nation, withdrawing himſelf for ever from the public gaze, content with ſecuring thoſe rewards which were doubtleſs intended as the meed of more ſucceſsful ſervices. Could Mr. Pitt be juſtly charged with diſcerning and deſigning all the miſchiefs which have flowed from that fountain of corrupt and bitter waters, of which he has made the nation drink ſo deeply, no terms would be adequate to the juſt expreſſion of our abhorrence. But, upon the moſt candid conſtruction of his conduct, our cenſure and reproach can only be

transferred

transferred from the heart to the head; and if he is not the moſt culpable of politicians, he is the moſt miſtaken and unfortunate of men. Surely the grave of LORD CHATHAM muſt be ready "to ope its ponderous and marble jaws to caſt "him up again," while this heir of his name and deſcendant of his blood is, by a ſpecies of unheard-of endurance, permitted with the deſpair, though without the ſtrength, of the blind man, to drag into ruin the mighty fabric of the Britiſh Empire.

In fine, is it invidious to aſk, Whether it be poſſible that Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville can flatter themſelves, that ſuch men as Sir William Temple and Sir Robert Walpole—if indeed our juvenile Miniſters were ever able to find time to read and reflect on the conduct of other Stateſmen, before or ſince they became Miniſters of State themſelves—would not, in the ſame circumſtances, have guided the affairs of the Public, implicitly confided to their care, with ſuperior diſcretion or ſuperior ſucceſs? Can they really think, had the pacific, generous, and conciliatory ſyſtem of Mr. Fox been adopted and acted upon in its full extent, that things would not, at this moment, have worn a more favorable aſpect in Great Britain, in Europe, in the

the World at large? If, as the parafitical defenders of the meafures of the Court contend, the acts of Mr. Pitt's adminiſtration have been dictated by conſummate wiſdom, what, in the name of GOD, muſt they ſuppoſe, in order to do juſtice to their own hypotheſis, would have been the reſult of the moſt exquiſite and conſummate folly? But the Government of this devoted country, in the opinion of many, is chargeable, not with error merely, but with guilt—guilt of the deepeſt crimſon dye. Let AFRICA, let the EASTERN and WESTERN INDIES, let AMERICA, let IRELAND tell—No; let them *not* tell; let them bury, if poſſible, in eternal ſilence and oblivion, the ſtory of their wrongs. A real and genuine repentance, bearing no ſemblance to the mock penitence of FASTS of STATE, may yet avert the impending blow. But, alas! the worſt of all omens, a general torpor, a morbid inſenſibility to the ſituation of the country, ſtrangely and fatally prevails; and, in ſpite of all that can be ſaid or done to awaken the nation from this ſleep of death, there is juſt reaſon to fear that we ſhall find the antient maxim too ſurely verified—*Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat.*

"No Commonwealth or Monarchy," ſays the celebrated

celebrated and ſagacious D'AVENANT, "did ever "arrive at a very great power but by methods "to be comprehended by the underſtandings of "men; and we read of no great empire ruined, "but the ſeeds of its deſtruction may have been "obſerved long before, in the courſe of its Hiſ- "tory; there being a certain degree of wiſdom, "induſtry, virtue and courage requiſite to ad- "vance a ſtate, and ſuch a meaſure of folly "and ill-conduct neceſſary to pull it down, a "Stateſman who would *compute* with any effect, "conducive to the public good, muſt conſult "variety of men and men of different talents; "and in any ſcheme he is to form, above all "things he muſt avoid flatterers and admirers, "or thoſe who depend upon him. Flatterers "will always aſſent, his admirers will be always "too much biaſſed by his opinions, and from "his dependents he can never have that contra- "diction by which truth muſt be ſifted out. "He that has ſuch *a computing head* will ſel- "dom enter into ill meaſures, he will not put "the wars of his prince upon a wrong foot; "he will not engage him in weak alliances; "he will not propoſe ill-digeſted ſchemes, and "funds for revenues that will not anſwer. In "any new counſel he will weigh the event "beforehand, and conſider how far it may diſ-

" turb his maſter's affairs, or affect the nation's " credit. Happy are thoſe kingdoms which " abound in Stateſmen ſo qualified; but miſer- " able is that country where the men of bu- " ſineſs do not *reckon right*, and where, in mat- " ters very important, and on which the whole " welfare of a people depends, they are allow- " ed to ſay, THEY are MISTAKEN."

Uſe of Political Arithmetic.

" WHEN giddy young men, without expe- " rience, are relied upon, and truſted in this " ſtation, they embroil the Prince's affairs. By " their ignorance they give his enemies ad- " vantage, and by their inſolence diſoblige his " friends. A man can be no more BORN a " STATESMAN than a Phyſician or a Lawyer; " and let the mind be never ſo happily diſpoſed, " time muſt ripen what is begot by nature. " He that has moſt experience in any kind of " buſineſs is the moſt prudent; and ſo much " more prudent than he that is new in that " kind of buſineſs, as not to be equalled by " any advantage of natural or extemporary wit. " Elder years, when they produce not wiſdom, " bring at leaſt caution, which is ſomething " like it. They who have ſeen much are uſed " to frequent diſappointments, and therefore

" not

" not inclined to *venture*—eſpecially they rarely " hazard the ſum of affairs upon any ſingle " council.

" The conduct of young Miniſters is ſeldom " ſucceſsful to themſelves nor to their maſters. " When warm heads, full of conceit, with ſlight " wit, and no true wiſdom, pretend to guide a " whole ſtate, and have a majority at their beck " and rule, in a ſhort time they occaſion more " diſorders than can be remedied in many years. " When perſons ſo deſcribed come to have a " corrupt majority of their ſide, they diminiſh " the nation's ſtock and its coin, they loſe its " trade, they anticipate all the Prince's revenues, " they charge the ſubject, for many years to " come, with a great number of new duties " and impoſitions, they bring the State into an " immenſe debt, and plunge it into ſuch diffi- " culties that hardly any new revenue can well " be erected. But 'tis *hoped* England will never " fall into ſuch deſtructive hands. Our wealth " and greatneſs depend abſolutely upon keeping " the Legiſlative Power to future ages untainted, " vigilant for the public ſafety, jealous of the " people's rights, watchful over the Miniſters, " and to have the Members not awed by armies, " nor to be ſeduced by preferments, bribes, or

" penſions. Writing for poſterity, to which theſe " papers may, peradventure, be tranſmitted, we " think it needful to give theſe cautions. While " we preſerve our Conſtitution as we received it " from our Anceſtors, bad men may have a ſhort " power to do miſchief, however their rage and " folly will be at laſt corrected.

Again.—" If any ſhould be ſo wicked as to " have any thoughts of enſlaving England, they " will endeavor to mate and quell the ſtomachs " of the common People, and they will try to " diſtreſs the Gentry in their eſtates to that " degree, as to make them rely upon the Court " for a livelihood and ſubſiſtence. Does not " this bring all into their power? They will " likewiſe plunge their Maſter into debts and " neceſſities, to render their tricks and arts of " more uſe; for we have ſeen that they who " procured money to be given were thought to " give it: and this ſingle merit atoned for all " their faults. It excuſed falſe ſteps and negli- " gence; it ſheltered their bribes, and covered " their diſability for the public ſervice. They " will entangle their Maſter's affairs, becauſe a " Prince that does not need money may come " not to need them whoſe talents conſiſt in pro- " curing taxes, not in well laying out the ſums " granted.

" granted. Large premiums, exorbitant intereſt,
" diverting appropriated funds, preferring one
" debt and poſtponing another, will always be
" good matter for ill Stateſmen to work upon.
" Of all things, they love a long and expenſive
" war, and fear peace; for peace produces order,
" and gives leiſure to enquire into the abuſes of
" the State. Peace reſtores Liberty of Speech,
" whereas in war all is ſilenced with the ſingle
" word NECESSITY. In peace, grievances
" may be calmly debated, the management of
" the revenues inſpected, the conduct of the
" Miniſters may be examined, and good laws
" may be propoſed, without the perpetual objec-
" tion of 'Are ye for bringing in the French
" and Popery?' War will better anſwer their
" deſigns, who mean to thrive by the looſe admi-
" niſtration with which war is generally accom-
" panied, and who propoſe to proſper by the
" calamities and miſery of their country.*

" In

* Doubtleſs there are numbers who will maintain, that the parallel ſtrictly holds in this as well as other reſpects, between the ſuppoſed Stateſmen of D'Avenant and the real Miniſters of the preſent day; but to this concluſion the writer of the preſent Pamphlet muſt, at leaſt, ſuſpend his aſſent. He is inclined to give full credit to the ſincerity of both Governments, in the late Negotiations for Peace. On the part of the Engliſh Ambaſſador, he can diſcover no hypocriſy indeed, but much art and little wiſdom. Sir William Temple, who concluded the Triple Alli-

" In future ages perhaps ambitious and defign-
" ing men may deſire to embroil their Maſter's
" affairs

ance in five days, and the ſecond Dutch Treaty in three days, would probably have found no difficulty in effecting an accommodation either with M. de la Croix or M. Le Tourneur; both of them men of candor and frankneſs. Had the three preliminary claims of France, at Liſle, been *proviſionally conceded*, no obſtacle, ſo far as appears, would have remained to impede the progreſs, or the proſperous concluſion of the negotiation. The ridiculous title of King of France was ſtyled by Mr. Pitt himſelf " a mere feather." It is indeed worſe than nothingneſs and vanity: it is a ſtanding cauſe of irritation to the Government and people of France. A great Miniſter, or indeed a great Monarch, would have deemed himſelf happy in any fair opportunity of diſcarding it. The Imperial mortgage on the Netherlands was, by the avowal of Lord Grenville, never meant to be inſiſted on. And with reſpect to the ſhips captured at Toulon, M. Le Tourneur made out a ſtrong and irreſiſtible caſe. The indemnifications for theſe conceſſions were, of courſe, to be obtained at the expence, not of France, but of the loſing parties, Spain and Holland. But till France knew certainly that England would conſent to the preliminary claims, it could never be reaſonably expected that ſhe would enter into ſerious diſcuſſions with her Allies, of a nature ſo unpleaſant as muſt neceſſarily be thoſe which related to the ceſſion of any of their poſſeſſions to Great Britain. From the unwillingneſs of the Engliſh Government to conſent explicitly to the preliminary demands, from the reluctance of the French Government to enter into ſubſequent diſcuſſions, or to explain themſelves on the ſubject of ſpecific indemnifications, aroſe that ſpirit of jealouſy and diſtruſt, which proved fatal to the ſucceſs of the Negotiation. Each party was convinced of the

inſincerity

" affairs only to make him more dependent upon
" their arts. Deſigning Miniſters, inſtead of
" reigning in his high courage with grave coun-
" cils, may diſguiſe from him the true ſtate of his
" affairs, and puſh him on to a new war, without
" making right proviſions, or ſuch previous
" leagues, as may make it tolerable in the pro-
" greſs or happy in the concluſion—wanting the
" ſublime part of wiſdom neceſſary for the con-
" duct of great affairs.

" The ' Old Whigs' were men whoſe prin-
" ciples will be revered in future ages by all ſuch
" as love their Country: they taught the neceſſity
" of making Parliament awful to Miniſters, and
" keeping the regal authority within the limits
" of the law; when Princes quit the old rules
" of right government, their ſubjects will be apt
" to forget the old rule, preſcribed for their obe-
" dience. We muſt implore the Whigs not to
" forget their old principles and their old maxims.
" If the Whigs ſhould hereafter take the ſtations

infincerity of the other, and on the re-aſcendency of violent counſels in France, the Negotiation was broken off, with circumſtances of rudeneſs and animoſity; but by no means of ſuch a nature as to preclude a fair proſpect of ſucceſs in any future Negotiation, conducted in a different mode, and by a more ingenuous and acceptable Negotiator.

" of the Tories, if they ſhould go upon that
" ground which the Tories have quitted, if they
" ſhould enter upon juſt ſuch meaſures, if they
" ſhould purſue the ſame counſels, if they ſhould
" ſuffer themſelves to be imbibed with Tory
" notions, our Conſtitution muſt be entirely loſt;
" for THEY may undermine it without ſuſpi-
" cion. Who will be jealous of thoſe who have
" been preaching up liberty and accuſing arbi-
" trary Miniſters for thirty years? THEY may
" change the form of our Government, and have
" the people of their ſide, who can have no jea-
" louſy of them; for the Whigs are the favorites
" of the people, as HAVING SO OFTEN
" PRESERVED ENGLAND. No perſon could
" be popular enough in Rome to think of ſub-
" verting its conſtitution in the purity of the
" Commonwealth but MANLIUS, who had
" ſaved the capitol. If the old Whigs, whoſe
" foreſight and courage has hitherto preſerved
" England, ſhould quite change their minds,
" and go thus retrograde from all their former
" ſpeeches, actions, and councils; if they ſhould
" thus come to clothe themſelves with the foul,
" ridiculous, and deteſted garments of the Tories,
" and give in to the worſt of their meaſures, then
" would the Conſtitution of this country be
" utterly ſubverted.

" The

" The giddy management of a few State " Empirics for a while may be ſupported; but " if what has been gathering for ſeven centuries " they ſhould ſquander away in a few years, the " cries of the people whom they ſo impoveriſh " will at laſt awaken Parliament to enquire " into and animadvert upon their wild pro- " ceedings. Though fortune may be ſaid to " govern in ſingle events, and here and there to " influence in the actions of private perſons, great " Monarchies and Commonwealths DO NOT " DEPEND UPON HER. Politic inſtitutions, " prudently ordered from the beginning, and " keeping on in a ſteady courſe of wiſdom and " virtue, are out of her power and rule, and " can never fail to proſper; and when diſaſters " happen to a State, 'tis ſeldom the work of " chance, but rather the effect of ſome miſ- " government. The Legiſlative Authority can " correct men of arbitrary principles, and pull " down the topping pride of inſolent and under- " taking Miniſters, who are by no means equal " to their buſineſs, and whoſe heads are giddy " and turn round in the eminence on which " fortune, flattery, and their other vices, not their " merit, has placed them. Depraved Courts, " wanting true wiſdom, make open war, with " deſert of every kind, and reckon it a *great con-*

" *queſt*

" *queſt* when they can get rid of a WARY AND " KNOWING STATESMAN. They think " it ſufficient to live to-day, and to make provi- " ſion for the preſent moment.

" If, in ſome future reign, we ſhould fall into " the hands of bad Miniſters, ſuch as have been " deſcribed, the eſtimates of the charge of war " will be the beſt ſhelter they can poſſibly have " for their profuſions of any kind, where they " may inſert *items*, never to be diſproved and " never to be underſtood. Finding how much " it turns to their own account to have an ample " revenue to range in, they will perſuade their " Prince to aſk all things, and to ſpare nothing. " If ſuch bad men ever come to be truſted, they " will make the body politic faint and look pale " with continual opening of its veins. They " will leave the Crown bare, the Exchequer " empty, and all the revenues anticipated. They " will diſtreſs the gentry, and beggar the com- " mon people; and having thus enriched them- " ſelves, and impoveriſhed all other degrees of " men, they will reduce the nation to be naked " and defenceleſs, hardly able to ſupport itſelf " at home, much leſs in a condition to undergo " another foreign war If by the giddy or rather " frantic conduct of beardleſs politicians, lifted

" perhaps

" perhaps up from the meaneſt obſcurity, and " ſet, in a manner, to hold the reins, our affairs " ſhould hereafter be brought ſo low, which God " forbid! as that we *muſt* ſit ſtill, while thoſe " dominions, *i. e.* Spain, &c. fall into a power, " already but too dreadful, how can univerſal " Monarchy be avoided?* When a Public that " was once clear and eaſy is overwhelmed with " debts, when this happens among a people that " have been always willing to give, and in a " Miniſtry that has never been backward to aſk, " when all occaſions have been ſupplied to their

* It will certainly be admitted, that the danger is not leſs imminent from the aſcendency of republican than monarchical principles, of jacobinical than papiſtical France. Yet how can it be forgotten, that within a very few years, this dreaded power courted our friendſhip, applied for our mediation, implored from us a favorable hearing; and how can the " giddy, frantic, beard-" leſs politicians," of whom D'Avenant propheſies, be forgiven for their inſolent and arrogant rejection of theſe advances? The following excellent leſſons of wiſdom, unhappily unknown to Mr. Pitt, or unregarded by him, are by one of the greateſt of hiſtorians put into the mouth of one of the greateſt and, for a long ſeries of years, the moſt ſucceſsful of Generals—*Quod ſi in ſecundis rebus, bonam quoque mentem darent Dii, non ea ſolum quæ eveniſſent, ſed etiam ea quæ evenire poſſent, reputaremus. Maximæ cuique fortunæ minime credendum eſt. Melior tutiorque eſt certa pax quam ſperata victoria; hæc in tua, illa in Deorum manu eſt. Cum tuas vires tum vim fortunæ Martemque belli communem propone animo.—Simul parta ac ſperata decora, unius horæ fortuna evertere poteſt.* Liv. lib. xxx. 30.

" full

" full demand, when ſuch a country does labour
" under difficulties almoſt inſuperable, and when,
" in ſome future reign, ALL THIS SHALL BE
" OUR CASE, mankind *will* entertain an opinion
" that the Adminiſtration IS NOT RIGHT—
" that they have not endeavored to moderate by
" grave and wholeſome Councils.

" 'Twould be endleſs to enumerate all the
" dangers that may befal a free Government, if
" it ſhould have at the head of its affairs a
" Miniſter of a bold and enterpriſing ſpirit, who,
" from a low degree, aſpires to the higheſt great-
" neſs, and whoſe ambition is not reſtrained by
" any private or public conſiderations. If, in
" ſome future reign, it ſhould be our caſe to have
" ſuch a man in a ſtation and with the power
" of doing much hurt, all ſuch as deſire to pre-
" ſerve their civil rights ſhould, with undaunted
" courage, ſet themſelves to ſtop him in his ca-
" reer, and to intercept him in his growth.

" If the affairs of the kingdom be ill-conducted,
" the united wiſdom of the nation muſt reſcue us
" out of weak and polluted hands, for ſuch a
" Miniſtry is a ſurer engine to deſtroy a State
" than any its enemies can bring againſt it. 'Tis
" true, ſuch as would correct errors, and watch

" that

" that no invaſion may be made on liberty, have
" been heretofore called a faction, by the perſons
" in power; but 'tis not properly their name,
" and ought to be given to another ſort of men.
" The name of faction does more truly belong
" to them who, though the body politic has all
" the ſigns of death upon it, yet ſay ' ALL IS
" WELL—that the riches of the nation are
" not to be exhauſted—that there is no miſ-
" government in all its buſineſs—that it feels
" no decay, and that its economy is perfect;'
" and who, all the while, are as arrogant and
" aſſuming as if they had ſaved that very people
" whom their folly and mad conduct has in a
" manner ruined. THEY may rather be termed
" the Faction, who were good patriots out of
" the Court, but are better courtiers in it; and
" who pretended to fear exceſs of power while
" it was not committed to them, but never
" think the Monarchy can be high enough ad-
" vanced while they are in adminiſtration.

" That ſour philoſophy which makes ſome
" perſons retire and abandon the State is by
" no means to be commended. Men of probity,
" ſkill, and virtue, ſhould be ready to aſſiſt the
" State with their true ſenſe and right under-
" ſtanding; nor ſhould they ſuffer the perfections

" of

" of their minds to be uſeleſs and unactive. Such " ought not to deſpair of the public, but aſſiſt, " with their wiſdom, to redeem a people from " their weak hands, who ſhall *get into power by* " *mere chance, when the nation perhaps has been in* " *an high ferment.* When things call loudly to " be amended; when unſkilful pilots have run " the ſhip a-ground, ſo that ſhe ſticks faſt, ready " to ſplit at the next coming of the waves; when " ignorant men are quite bewildered in their " errors; when the whole people ſee and feel " the effect of ill Government; when the Prince " grows aſhamed of thoſe whom his ſubjects " hate and fear; when the Commonwealth " cannot emerge out of its debts and difficulties " without help from abler hands—then is the " true time for the beſt men to offer themſelves " to the ſervice of their country.

" Let ſome flatterers ſay what they will, " the Vulgar are not impatient of any rule " that is tolerably fair and eaſy, ſo that Kings " who will but ſtoop to be the leaſt popular, are " idolized in every country: the ſame thing " holds in relation to Miniſters. If they are ho- " neſt; if they have a ſuperior genius; if by " their actions it is known that they do not de- " ſire to hold their ſtations upon any ignoble " terms;

" terms; if they are not haughty, arrogant, and " inſolent;—they may rule the State without cla- " mors;—they may grow grey in their dignities " and offices. If by inadvertency, and through " the frailty of human nature, they have made " falſe ſteps and committed faults, the general " voice will be ready to excuſe them, and their " perfections ſhall be put in the balance and " outweigh their errors.

" But when CORRUPTION has ſeized upon the " REPRESENTATIVES of a PEOPLE, 'tis like a " chronical diſeaſe, hardly to be rooted out. A " tyranny that governs by the ſword, has few " friends but men of the ſword. But *a legal ty-* " *ranny* has of its ſide the rich, the fearful, the " lazy, thoſe that *know* the law, and *get* by it, " ambitious churchmen, and all thoſe whoſe " livelihood depends upon the quiet poſture of " affairs; ſo that ſuch a tyranny is hardly to be " ſhaken off. When ſuch a corruption happens, " we may indeed preſerve the name of Liberty, " and ſome of its outward forms, but no more " than will help to keep our chains the faſter " on: that ſervitude is laſting where the peo- " ple are left to make their own fetters. The " people of Rome were lulled aſleep with the

" opinion

" opinion they entertained, that the laws ſtill " governed, becauſe they ſaw every year Con- " ſuls and a Senate; but this Senate being cor- " rupted, made the tyranny BOUNDLESS and " SAFE."

On private Men's Duty in the Adminiſtration of Public Affairs.

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CONCLUSION.

ON the final reviſion of the preceding obſervations, ſo ſtrongly does the importance of the ſubject impreſs itſelf upon my mind, that I am tempted to add yet two or three *parting* reflections—a few *more LAST WORDS*. The Public, as I gratefully acknowledge, have done me the honor—I will uſe a bolder word—the juſtice, to allow that, in my political writings, I have had the public intereſts ſolely in view. I have indeed no perſonal intereſt to ſerve. If I had, I ſhould have conſulted it very ill in taking ſo decided a part againſt the meaſures of the Adminiſtration. That ſeveral of the principal Members of the Oppoſition in both Houſes have honored me with their friendſhip, it is my pride to avow. On the adverſe ſide are alſo

thoſe

thoſe for whom I entertain the higheſt perſonal eſteem and value. But obligations, excepting thoſe of friendſhip and hoſpitality, I have never received from any perſon. Placed in a ſituation of independence calculated for obſervation, and, as I thought, favorable for forming a juſt eſtimate of things; endowed, perhaps not in a leſs degree than others, with faculties to judge, and flattering myſelf with the hope of a fair and impartial hearing from the Public, I cauſed to be printed in December 1792, a Tract, ſtating in terms as ſtrong and impreſſive as I could invent, the errors of the extraordinary policy then adopted, and the fatal conſequences which muſt inevitably enſue from it; bearing in mind, as my apology, the juſt and generous conceſſion of the great Frederic of Pruſſia, "Il y a dans tous les états un nom-"bre de citoyens, gens ſenſés, qui loin du "tumulte des affaires les enviſagent ſans paſ-"ſion, & en jugent par-là même ſainement, tan-"dis que ceux qui tiennent en main le gou "vernail, ne voient les objets qu'avec des yeux "faſcinés." When returned from the printing-office, I was informed that the Bookſeller, juſtly alarmed at the recent proſecutions and convictions, would not *riſque* the publication. As the Nation therefore would not endure to

hear the truth, it was, by this ſpecies of coercion, ſuppreſſed. It is now, I preſume, not *unſafe* to mention, that in this Tract I ventured thus to expreſs myſelf:—"A WAR with FRANCE "is in contemplation—a WAR by which every "thing may be loſt, and nothing can be gained; "and the ultimate conſequences of which no "human wiſdom can calculate. Had this Na- "tion acted in conformity to the dictates of true "policy, ſhe would with pleaſure have em- "braced thoſe overtures of amity which were "made by France at the period of the eſtabliſh- "ment of her Conſtitution. An alliance with "England would, in all probability, have effec- "tually preſerved that Conſtitution from any "danger of alteration or attack, and the peace "of Europe would have been rendered ſe- "cure and permanent. But without venturing "openly to join the confederacy of Auſtria and "Pruſſia, by appearing inſidiouſly and indirectly "to countenance it, Britain became the ob- "ject of Gallic ſuſpicion, if not rather of Gallic "reſentment and averſion. At the moment, "however, when France riſes victorious over "all her enemies, and the opportunity of acting "with effect is irretrievably loſt—at that mo- "ment we chuſe to embark as principals in the "quarrel." And in relation to the then ſitua-

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tion of affairs in the United Provinces, it is ſaid, that "excluſive of the obligation of trea-
"ties we have now no rational motive to in-
"terpoſe in any ſhape but that of a common
"Mediator. But a treaty of alliance and gua-
"rantee actually ſubſiſting, it muſt be acknow-
"ledged incumbent upon us, however faithleſs
"other nations may have been, to fulfil the con-
"ditions of it, though certainly not till the effect
"of an amicable negotiation has been tried.
"But, without doubt, the Dutch too well know
"the probable conſequences of a French in-
"vaſion, ſeriouſly to think of riſquing the con-
"teſt. Is any one ſo ignorant as to need the in-
"formation, that a great majority of the ſubjects
"of the Dutch Commonwealth are extremely
"diſſatisfied with their Government? Or that
"our interpoſition in *favor* of Holland might
"eventually prove as fatal to the Stadtholder as
"the ſimilar interpoſition of Auſtria and Pruſſia
"has been to the late unfortunate Monarch of
"France? But that ſpirit of deluſion which has
"almoſt invariably actuated the Councils of
"Great Britain under the preſent reign, ſtill
"continues to predominate; and will, if any
"thing can, precipitate the nation into thoſe
"calamities which are ſo much and ſo reaſon-
"ably the object of the public dread, and which

" a ſpirit of conciliation, of equity, and of wiſ-
" dom, will alone, in the event, be found ade-
" quate to avert."

Yet, though exerciſing this unreſerved freedom of language, ſo far have I carried my practical ſubmiſſion to the laws and conſtituted authorities of my country, as to lend my beſt aſſiſtance individually to carry into effect acts of the Legiſlature originating in the dreadful neceſſities of the preſent war, the principle of which I wholly diſapproved. A real, and even a zealous friend to reform, *becauſe* I wiſh to preſerve and perpetuate the Conſtitution, and *becauſe* I am perſuaded that the manifold abuſes and corruptions, nouriſhed and foſtered by the preſent ſyſtem, will ultimately prove its deſtruction. Alas! is this mere ſpeculation and theory? May we not appeal to facts, the moſt awful and impreſſive? But we live in an age and country where experience has loſt its effect, " where the groſſeſt enormities and the moſt
" wanton prodigality are exhauſting the patience
" of the people, and where the example of
" France is the fartheſt from being likely to
" operate as a warning."

It may poſſibly be thought by ſome readers, whom

whom I could wiſh to pleaſe at any expence but the expence of truth, that the reflexions caſt upon Mr. Pitt are too pointed and perſonal. I ſhould greatly regret to incur the juſt cenſure of illiberality; but it muſt be conſidered, that Mr. Pitt is ſpoken of merely as a Stateſman, for as a private individual he may poſſibly be the moſt virtuous of mankind. But to govern the Britiſh Empire he has, by long experience, demonſtrated himſelf to be utterly incapable and incompetent. His public conduct has been ſuch as to baniſh all rational confidence, all cheerful expectation. It is an inexpreſſible ſatisfaction to me to bear this open and unequivocal teſtimony againſt him, a teſtimony dictated entirely by public motives, and wholly devoid of perſonal rancor. So long as the King and the nation think proper to continue him in power, I would pay him externally and officially all the reſpect due to his high ſtation, being deſirous in all points, and to the utmoſt extent, to maintain inviolate the civil and ſocial order eſtabliſhed by law, and deprecating with horror all popular intervention. But now, that a fair opportunity occurs of declaring the ſentiments which have for many years paſt poſſeſſed my mind of his political character and conduct, I ſhould deem it

it *high treaſon* to the human race to palliate or to diſguiſe them.

AT the very moment of concluding this Pamphlet, the certain intelligence is received of a moſt complete and glorious Naval Victory obtained over the French in the Levant. Can there be an happier or more ſeaſonable incident than this, if improved, to the grand purpoſe of reſtoring the general tranquillity? This is a criſis of that deſcription which a great Stateſman would embrace with ardor, in order to accompliſh what the Nation ſo eagerly wiſhes to obtain—a ſafe and honorable peace. The naval power of France has ſuſtained a mighty ſhock, her deſigns upon Ireland have been fruſtrated, and her boaſtful menaces of invaſion have been rendered nugatory by the magnanimous ſpirit diſplayed by the Britiſh nation. Still France is formidable beyond all modern or antient precedent of hiſtory. Her Republican and Revolutionary ſpirit, which nothing but a ſeries of peaceful years can change, prompts and enables her to become on all occaſions the aſſailant. The communication of that ſpirit to Ireland is in the higheſt degree alarming.

alarming. Our moſt ſplendid victories are victories merely of ſelf-defence; and the final reſult of the moſt daring enterprize of modern ages, as yet, hangs doubtful in the ſcale. Now then, during this precarious, perhaps tranſient, moment of ſuperiority, let a frank, a generous, and truly conciliatory overture of pacification be made to France. If the Negotiation be actuated by the diſdainful ſpirit of Lord Grenville, or the diſputatious ſpirit of Lord Malmeſbury, it will be certainly ineffectual, and can terminate only, as before, in augmented animoſity. But the expectation is vain! The abounding pride and deficient wiſdom of the Britiſh Cabinet is too well aſcertained to admit the fainteſt ray of hope to illumine the "darkneſs viſible" of the proſpect. Poſſeſſed by the demon of deluſion, the Miniſters now preſiding over the affairs of the Country ſeem born for its deſtruction. As they are unqueſtionably the Authors, ſo they will, in all human probability, be the Finiſhers of the national ruin.

POSTSCRIPT.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE Author of the Hiſtory of the Houſe of Brunſwick having been publicly charged with being "a mere Copyiſt of Smollet as to facts," though the authority of that writer, "as to facts," has not been relied upon probably in a ſingle inſtance, it will be regarded not as the effect of vanity, it may be hoped, but ſolely of a deſire to repel ſo prepoſterous and injurious an aſſertion, that a Catalogue is here ſubjoined of the various publications not merely referred to, but *actually quoted* in the courſe of the Hiſtory. With reſpect to facts of general publicity, admitted by all parties, the writer deemed an oſtentatious and minute ſpecification of authorities wholly ſuperfluous; and in regard to thoſe particulars which reſted upon the baſis of a ſingle atteſtation, ſuch as may be found in the publications of Lord Balcarras, Col. Hook, M. Meſnager, &c. &c. the citations are, for the moſt part, given at length, and inſerted in the text. Theſe obſervations are applicable chiefly to the two firſt volumes (4to) of the Hiſtory; for the two latter muſt, in juſtice, be conſidered as an original Work,

Work, compiled from the moſt authentic materials, and corroborated by information far ſuperior to that which contemporary writers are generally fortunate enough to be able to obtain.

CATALOGUE
OF AUTHORITIES,
&c. &c.

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Parliamentary Debates.
Lords' Proteſts.

State Papers - - - - - -	Lamberti.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Cole.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Hardwicke.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Dalrymple.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Macpherſon.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Rouſſet.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	D'Eſtrades.
Hiſtory of England - - -	Granger.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Tindal.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Smollet.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Ralph.
Ditto - - - - - - - -	Somerville.
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Ditto - - - - - - - -	Hume.

History of his own Times -	King of Prussia.
History of Charles XII. -	Voltaire.
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History of Dekkan - - -	Scott.
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History of the American War	Gordon.
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Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Maty.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Du-Mourier.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	King James II.
Letters, Tracts, &c. - -	Lord Balcarras.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Dutchess of Marlborough.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Lediard.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Col. Hooke.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Lord Bolingbroke.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Lord Melcombe.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Edmund Burke.
Ditto - - - - - - - - -	Le-Clerc.

Letters

Letters, Tracts, &c. - - Swift.
Ditto - - - - - - - - Price.
Ditto - - - - - - - - Lord Chesterfield.
Ditto - - - - - - - - Lord Delamere.
Ditto - - - - - - - - Archbishop King.
Ditto - - - - - - - - General Lee.
Ditto - - - - - - - - Dr. Franklin.
Ditto - - - - - - - - Junius.

India Tracts, Letters, and Reports, a very large collection, from which more than an hundred quotations, and some of great length, are inserted in the History. Many other publications of recent and of elder date have been carefully consulted, though no specific references to them are found or extracts given.

FINIS.